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NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery
Workers Union, Local 365
United Steelworkers of America
AFL-CIO
and

'
'

American Smelting & Refining Co.

!

'
'
i
'

Award

\, ^ £>

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated April 3, 1968 to June 30, 1971
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards as follows:
The Company violated Article IX Section 6 of the
contract when it failed to give Anthony Nagy a
chance to demonstrate his physical ability to work
as a janitor. He shall be reinstated to a janitor's
job with his seniority intact, in accordance with
that seniority, but without back pay.

Eric fit Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July

1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this
day of July, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery
Workers Union, Local 365
United Steelworkers of America
AFL-CIO
and

'
'
'
'

American Smelting & Refining Co.

'

Opinion

i

In accordance with Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective April 3, 1968 to June 30, 1971 between
American Smelting & Refining Co., hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," and Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery Workers
Union Local 365, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Did the Company violate the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by terminating and refusing to reinstate
Anthony Nagy?
A hearing was held on April 21, 1970 at the Company plant
in Perth Amboy, New Jersey at which time Mr. Nagy, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union
and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

The

The parties filed post

hearing briefs.
With the agreement of, and accompanied by representatives
of the parties, the Arbitrator visited the plant on July 1, 1970

- 2 and observed the jobs of yardmaster and janitor.
The pertinent contract clauses are Article XII Section 1
which reads:
The Management of the Plant and the direction of the
working forces including the right to hire, suspend
or discharge for proper cause and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work
and for other just causes is vested exclusively in
the Company subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
and Article IX Section 6 which reads:
An employee sustaining permanent injury in the
Plant will be continued in employment if possible
and practical to do so, provided such employment does
not constitute an unreasonable burden or hazard to
the Company, and further, providing that the injury
was not due to the personal carelessness of the employee or the infraction of any Plant safety rule.
The grievant's work record; the injuries to his back for
which he received disability payments and workmen's compensation;

that the injury occurred or was aggravated in the plant;

and the periods of time he did not work because of that disability are not disputed and need not be recited herein.
What is in dispute is the propriety of his discharge,
effectuated November 18, 1969, for the following reason, stated
by the Company in the written notice of dismissal:
"Physical condition of such a nature that it is
impossible and impractical to continue employment. It further would provide an unreasonable
burden and hazard to the Company."
The grievant was last at work on August 25, 1965 as a
yardmaster (a classification to which he was assigned that day
for training.)

Because of his back disability he did not re-

turn to active work with the Company thereafter.

He remained

out, receiving either disability benefits or workmen's compen-

- 3 sation thereafter,

and was discharged in accordance with the

foregoing dismissal notice on November 18, 1969.
The Union contends that the discharge was improper because
the grievant was physically capable of returning to and performing the duties required of the yardmaster classification.
And in the alternative, that he was physically capable of
carrying out the duties of a janitor, to which the union claims
the Company should have assigned him in accordance with past
practice followed under Article IX Section 6 of the Agreement,
if it concluded the yardmaster's duties were too demanding.
It is the Company's position that the grievant was and
is physically incapable of performing the yardmaster job; that
he has no right to claim a janitorial position, and in any
event he was and is not physically capable of performing that
latter job either.

And to place him in either job would expose

him to serious aggravation of his present back disability,
which would constitute an unreasonable burden or hazard to the
Company.
As I see it Article IX Section 6 is a unique contractual
provision.

Clearly it creates a presumption in favor of reten-

tion in the Company's employ, of an employee who has sustained
an injury in the plant even though that injury be permanent in
nature.

I am satisfied that the intent and purpose of this

contractual clause is not limited to the job or jobs which the
injured employee held prior to his injury.

For that would ren-

der the clause largely meaningless inasmuch as the injury would
disable him from the job he then held.

It does not state that

- he shall be continued in employment in the same job or in any

- 4other job which he previously held, but rather uses the general phrase "continued in employment."

To my mind that means

that the parties agreed to make an effort where possible and
practical, to place the injured employee in a different job
within the plant which he could perform despite his permanent
disability, so long as it did not constitute an unreasonable
burden or hazard to the Company.

So I cannot accept the Com-

pany's assertion that the grievant's rights under Article IX
Section 6 are confined to the last job he held - that of yardmaster.

Indeed the practices of the parties support the wider

application of that contract section.

In other situations,

admittedly by mutual agreement, the Company and the Union have
placed employees with various disabilities resulting from injuries in the plant in the janitorial classification.

That

they did so by mutual agreement does not mean that the Company
must grant a janitorial position to an employee otherwise disabled from his regular classification, when his physical ability to perform the janitorial duties are in dispute.

But

rather that the janitor's job is one which an employee has the
right to seek and for which he should be considered under
Article IX Section 6.
In short an employee's physical ability to do a janitorial job certainly may be disputed by the Company, subject to
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, but
that classification is properly within the scope of "employment" within the meaning of Article IX Section 6 of the contract.
So the issue before me is not simply whether the grievant

- 5 is physically capable of working as a yardmaster without placing an unreasonable burden or hazard on the Company, but also
whether the same is true with regard to the janitorial position
which he, and the Union on his behalf, seek in the alternative.
Article IX Section 6 is also unique in that it limits the
continued employment of a permanently injured employee, where
possible and practical, not if hazardous or burdensome to the
employee himself, but only if burdensome and hazardous to an
unreasonable degree to the Company. So a bare danger to the
employee himself is immaterial.

Only if the unreasonable bur-

den or hazard is placed on the Company, may the employee be
deprived of continued employment.
In the instant case there is no real dispute over the
procedural possibility or practicality of placing the grievant
in either the yardmaster or janitor job.

Openings in both

classification appear to have been available at the time that
the grievant was terminated.

The dispute centers on whether

the grievant's assignment to one or the other would constitute
an unreasonable burden or hazard to the Company because of the
grievant's back disability.
I think it significant that the contract clause uses the
phrase "unreasonable burden or hazard" not just "burden or
hazard."

Obviously this means that the Company should retain

the employee even if there be some burden or hazard; but not
continue him in employment where that burden or hazard reaches
an unreasonable level.
There is no doubt that had the grievant been retained as
either a yardmaster or janitor the Company would have been

- 6 faced with some burden or hazard.

But as I see it, it was only

in the form of additional potential monetary liability for disability insurance or workmen's compensation.

The duties of

the yardmaster and janitor are not of the type to have a critical effect on productivity.

The Company would have been incon-

venienced had it been required to assign some other employee
to complete the janitorial tasks or yardmaster work if the
grievant was unable to perform them.

But I am not persuaded

that that meets the test of a "burden or hazard."

And even if

the loss or interruption of productivity (which I have characterized as an "inconvenience") could be construed as a burden or hazard, I fail to see how it could reach the level of
an "unreasonable burden or hazard."
Nor do I see how it can be argued (and the Company does
not so argue) that the grievant's employment in either job would
represent a burden or hazard to other employees.

Both jobs are

relatively isolated; with duties performed primarily alone.

So

if for physical reasons the grievant could not carry out a particular yardmaster or janitorial assignment, the work of other
employees might be delayed or otherwise encumbered, but I do
not find that other employees would be unduly burdened or endangered or otherwise placed in jeopardy.

So the "unreasonable

burden or hazard" is limited, in my judgment, to the Company's
potential monetary liability for any aggravation of the grievant1 s back injury.
That the Company would be faced with a burden or hazard
by the retention of the grievant in either job is manifest and
not disputed.

However that is not enough to deprive him of

- 7 continuing employment.

Instead the burden or hazard must be

of an unreasonable nature.
My task therefore narrows to determining whether the
grievant's continued employment would have constituted an unreasonable burden or hazard or simply a burden or hazard.

Lim-

ited to the facts in the instant case a distinction between the
two turns on the probability of a re-injury.

If re-injury to

the grievant's back is probable, then disability and compensation liability is equally probable, and I would find that the
burden or hazard to the Company was unreasonable.

But if re-

injury is speculative or contingent, depending upon the nature
of the duties and what care the grievant takes in performing
those duties, provided of course he performs them satisfactorily,
then, though the burden and hazard remain, I would not be prepared to conclude that it was of unreasonable proportions.
I have considered the medical testimony, the rest of the
entire record, and my personal observations of the two jobs
in question.

I have concluded that the chance of re-injury to

the grievant's back is probable if he returned to the yardmaster classification, but possible rather than probable as a
janitor.

Though the yardmaster is called upon to break open

freight car seals, slide open freight car doors and climb into
gondolas only infrequently, any one such activity could seriously aggravate the grievant's back condition, and that could
happen any single time he performs any of those duties.
frequency of those tasks is immaterial.

The

The fact is that if

he is required to do it at all, the probability of re-injury to
his back any and each time he carries out those duties is highly

- 8 probable, in my judgment.

So I find no fault with the Company's

decision to foreclose the grievant from an opportunity to return as a yardmaster.
But the presumption in Article IX Section 6 of the contract,
in favor of continued employment despite the permanence of the
injury, has not been overturned in connection with the janitorial job.

That the Company has not assigned that job to any-

body in the past with a back condition does not mean that the
test of unreasonable burden or hazard has been met simply by a
back disability.

So long as the janitor job falls within the

scope of "employment" in the application of Article IX Section 6
of the contract, employees may not be excluded merely because
they suffer from a back injury.

The extent and nature of the

injury and disability must be considered on a case to case
basis, to determine whether employment as a janitor involves a
probable chance of re-injury or aggravation to the injury; or
whether re-injury is merely a conjectural possibility.

It is

my conclusion that if the grievant had been re-employed as a
janitor the chance of re-injury, albeit possible and therefore
a burden or hazard to the Company, has not been shown to be so
probable as to constitute an unreasonable burden or hazard to
the Company.
I observed the wash buckets, mops and other equipment
which the janitor regularly uses and I think the grievant should
be given an opportunity to demonstrate that he can use this
equipment to the Company's satisfaction despite the permanence
of his back condition.

The wash buckets which are the heavi-

est pieces of equipment are on wheels and need not be lifted

- 9 while full.

They are filled with a hose; emptied through

drains in the floor when tipped at floor level and lifted only
when empty.

The heavy polishing and waxing machinery is not

used by the particular janitorial classification which the
grievant seeks.

I am not impressed with the alleged heaviness

of the garbage cans.

They are plastic, not metal.

They con-

tain primarily paper debris and appear rarely to be more than
1/3 full.

Consequently the task of moving and emptying them

periodically each day does not reach a level of probable risk.
Accordingly I direct that the Company afford the grievant an opportunity to demonstrate his ability to perform the
duties of a janitor.

He shall be reinstated to a janitor's

job with his seniority intact and in accordance with that seniority.

Because I am not certain how well or for how long he

actually would have performed those duties had he been so employed rather than discharged, the question of how much money
he lost is indeterminable.
which to grant back pay.

Therefore I find no grounds upon

Accordingly re-employment as a jani-

tor shall be without back pay.
Prospectively, if the parties are in dispute over whether
the grievant is performing the janitor job satisfactorily, as
well as his ability to do so, those questions may be referred
back to me if both sides choose to do so; or if not, shall be
matters for the grievance and arbitration provisions of the
contract.

Eric/G. Schmertz
Arbitrator

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery
Workers Union Local 365
Award

and
American Smelting & Refining Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named parties, and dated April 3, 1968 through June 30,
1971, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
parties, Awards as follows:
I accept the Company's version of the events of
January 28, 1970. I find therefore that William
T. Graham, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," used physical force against Foreman Stutski,
without justification. I do not find that the
grievant was provoked in any manner that would
warrant his action. If he felt the Foreman was
improperly assigning him to work that day; or
was not crediting him with the correct clock-in
time; or was interfering with his meal period, or
for any other complaint he could and should have
made use of the grievance procedure for redress.
In deliberately shoving and pushing the Foreman
from the room the grievant was manifestly insubordinate
and defiant of supervisory authority. Accordingly, the
Company's action in discharging him was for just cause
and is upheld,,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 24, 1970
STATE OF New York )
ss.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 24th day of August, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me tobe
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 69-465

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
!

Wire Service Guild Local 222
American Newspaper Guild

'
'
i

and

'
i

Associated Press

'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1971 and having been duly sworn and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
The Employer's act on March 12, 1969 of removing
the disputed notice from the Guild's bulletin
board in the Los Angeles Bureau was violative of
Article XXVII Section 2 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February
1970
STATE OF New York
) gg
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of February, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in andwho executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0615 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Wire Service Guild Local 222
American Newspaper Guild
and

'
'
i
'
'
i
'
i

Associated Press

Opinion

'
i

In accordance with Article V of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated January 1, 1969 through December 31, 1971 between Wire Service Guild Local 222 American Newspaper Guild,
hereinafter referred to as the "Guild," and the Associated
Press hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to decide a dispute
relating to Article XXVII Section 2 of the contract.
A hearing was held at the New York City offices of the
American Arbitration Association on November 26, 1969 at which
time representatives of the Guild and Employer, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post

hearing briefs and the hearings were declared closed as of
January 22, 1970.
On March 11 or 12, 1969 the Guild posted on the Guild
bulletin board at the Employer's Los Angeles office, a copy of
a letter from the Guild Chairman, Los Angeles, to employee
Howard C. Heyn.

The letter related to the Guild's strike

against the Employer which took place some time earlier; to
the alleged conduct of Mr. Heyn during that strike, and to

- 2 Guild disciplinary proceedings against him.

On March 12 a

representative of the Employer removed that posting from the
bulletin board.

That action led to the Union's grievance

and to the instant arbitration case.
The Union grievance in pertinent part reads:
The Wire Service Guild charges violation of
Article XXVII Section2 .... of the contract between the parties, by removal by the Associated
Press on or about March 12, 1969, of a notice
on the Wire Service Guild bulletin board in the
Los Angeles Associated Press Bureau. The notice removed pertained to the filing of the
internal disciplinary charges against listed
members of the Wire Service Guild.
Article XXVII Section 2 reads:
Bulletin Boards. The Employer agrees to provide bulletin boards suitably placed in all
bureaus for the exclusive use of the Guild.
The Employer justifies its action on the grounds that
the notice or posting was "scurrilous, coercive, intimidating,
threatening and derogatory;" that Heyn was not subject to the
Guild's jurisdiction; that the disciplinary action referred
to therein was not sanctioned by the Guild; and that the
form of discipline referred to was improper.

The Employer

also cites Labor Board and other decisions which hold that a
Union's right of free speech, either in distributing or posting literature within the plant or on an employer's property
does not include the freedom to "insult, lampoon, defame,
ridicule, threaten or hold up to contempt the employer or
employees."
I agree with the Employer in connection with these restrictions on the Union's right to distribute and/or post notices and other material.

But as I see it that is not the

- 3 question before me.

The issue is of narrower scope.

The griev-

ance specifically objects to the Employer's removal of the notice from the Wire Service Guild bulletin board.

The issue

then as I see it is:
Whether, if the Employer considers a Guild notice
posted on the Guild's bulletin board to be of a
proscribed type, he has the right to unilaterally
remove it?
Based on the explicit language of Article XXVII Section 2
(which is all that is pertinent to this case) I answer that
question in the negative.

That contract clause grants the

Guild a bulletin board in all bureaus for the Guild's exclusive
use.

Exclusiveness means that nobody other than the Guild may

use it.

As negotiated, it means that the Employer relinquish-

ed both the use and control of that bulletin board to the
Guild, though it is located on his property.

The right of the

Employer to physically remove a notice posted by the Guild on
that bulletin board is manifestly an interference with or a
restriction on a "right of use."

To grant the Guild exclusive-

ness on one hand, while reserving on the other the right to
remove objectionable postings, are mutually

incompatible.

I agree that the "Guild's use" relates to notices and
other documents involving the Guild's business or activities.
I find that the disputed notice in the instant case met that
test.
The Guild had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Heyn
was still a member at the time of the strike.

That he had been

transferred from Los Angeles to New York I consider immaterial.
And obviously the strike and the activity of members during

- 4 that strike are matters well within the Guild's concern.

But

even if the notice had not met that test; or if as the Employer contends, it was defamatory, insulting, threatening and an
improper exercise of the Guild's jurisdiction and disciplinary
authority, the granting of exclusive use of the bulletin board
to the Guild in Article XXVII Section 2 precludes the Employer
from removing such a notice from the bulletin board.
This does not mean he is foreclosed from a remedy.

As I

see it he may instruct the Guild representative to remove the
notice, which would place the substantive propriety of that
notice in issue, or he may commence an action either through
the grievance procedure of the contract, before the Labor
Board, or in any other proper forum, to protest the notice and
to seek an order directing its removal or authorizing him to
remove it.

Also, the Guild's rights under Article XXVII Sec-

tion 2 of the contract do not foreclose Mr. Heyn from any
civil action which he may wish to maintain if he believes the
notice to be defamatory or otherwise actionable.

So he too

has a remedy if the disputed notice went beyond acceptable
bounds.
In short, it seems to me that when the parties negotiated
Article XXVII Section 2 and provided a bulletin board for the
exclusive use of the Guild, it was well within the contemplation of the Employer, that occasionally some of the posted
notices might be adversary, partisan, abrasive in nature, and
even grossly inaccurate.

Yet that section of the contract did

not include any exceptions to the Guild's exclusive use.

If

- 5 the Employer intended to reserve the right to unilateral removal notices which it deemed objectionable, that right could
and should have been included in the contract.

That it was

not means that the Employer must pursue a different procedure
in order to obtain the removal of objectionable or proscribed
material from the Guild's bulletin board.
Of course, in an extreme situation, where the subject
matter of a notice or other posted document is so unconscionable, unsocial or reprehensible as to warrant its immediate
removal, and where any delay in its removal might cause irreparable damage, I would permit its forthwith removal by the
Employer.

But I do not find the notice in the instant case

to be of that type.
Accordingly the Employer's act of removing the disputed
notice from the Guild's bulletin board at the Los Angeles
office was violative of Article XXVII Section 2 of the contract,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
™ „_________„„_„,____ _ _ « _ _ _____ ___________ ___.„__(
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

District Council 37 and its affiliated
Local #1482, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

'
'
'
i

Award

'
i

and

Brooklyn Public Library

'
r

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 6, 1969 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards as follows:
The Union's grievance that Bookmobile drivers
are performing job functions outside of their
job specifications is denied.

'

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June
19 7 0
STATE OF New York
)ss<.
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
' day of June, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

Case No. 1330 1200 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

District Council 37 and its affiliated
'
Local #1482, American Federation of State, '
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
'
!

and
Brooklyn Public Library

'

Opinion

'

In accordance with Article XVII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 6, 1969 between the Brooklyn Public
Library, hereinafter referred to as the "Library" and District
Council 37 and its affiliated Local #1482, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue;
Whether the Bookmobile drivers are performing
the job functions outside of their job specifications? If so, what shall be the remedy under
the contract?
A hearing was held on April 24, 1970 at which time representatives of the Union and Library, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post hearing briefs

The job functions in dispute are of a clerical nature.
For approximately

30 years the Library has had in existence

the services of a Bookmobile - a library on wheels.

This mo-

bile unit brings library services to neighborhoods by travelling to, and positioning itself at various community locations.

- 2 At these locations the public may borrow and return books in
accordance with usual library procedures.

The Bookmobile is

staffed by a driver and one or more librarians and clerks.
Since the institution of the Bookmobile the Library has
assigned the drivers (classified as Motor Vehicle Operators)
clerical duties as follows; handling books returned by patrons;
discharging books to patrons; collecting fines for overdue materials; charging patrons for lost transactions and book cards;
filling out forms for unpaid fines and charges and for messenger books; preparing interchange material and checking reserve
panels.
The Union contends that the foregoing clerical duties are
not properly within the job classification of the Bookmobile
driver.

It seeks an Award deleting those duties from his job

assignment.
The Union's case is argued in the alternative.

It asserts

that because the City of New York both approved or affixed the
title of "Motor Vehicle Operator" to the Bookmobile driver, and
provides a substantial amount of the money used to run the
Library and pay its personnel, the "job specifications" of a
"Motor Vehicle Operator" employed by the City of New York is
binding on the Library and controls the job duties properly
assignable to the Bookmobile driver.

Also the Union contends

that in May 1969, the Library promulgated an announcement of
staff vacancies which constituted a "job description" for
Motor Vehicle Operators employed by the Library, to which the
Library must be bound.

The Union points out that neither the

- 3 New York City job description for its Motor Vehicle Operators,
(dated November 29, 1965) nor the Library's announcement in
May, 1969 include the disputed clerical duties, and that therefore those duties are not a proper part of the job of the
Bookmobile drivers, classified as Motor Vehicle Operators,
I cannot accept either contention advanced by the Union.
Employment with the Library is not employment with the City
of New York, despite the fact that the City provides substantial financial support to the Library, both for its general
operation and to pay the drivers.

Also there can be no dis-

pute that the function of the Library differs from that of
any agency of the City of New York.

Hence a Motor Vehicle

Operator working for the former may well have duties indigenous to the Library that are different from those required of
a Motor Vehicle Operator for a City agency.

Indeed, in my

view, for a City "job description" to be applicable to or
binding on non-City employment at the Library, there must be
some explicit provision, either in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, or in some rule, regulation or procedure, which
actually or by reference, mandates such coverage.

Especially

so when, as here, the General Statement of Duties and Responsibilities in the City Motor Vehicle Operator "job

description"

expressly limits the enumerated vehicles to those "used by
City Departments."

By its own terms, the job description

upon which the Union relies is confined to City departments.
And I find no provision in the contract or elsewhere which
includes this job description as applicable to the Motor

- 4 Vehicle Operator who drives the Library Bookmobile.
As a matter of fact 1 am not certain that the delineation
of duties set forth in the City Motor Vehicle Operator "description" constitutes a job specification at all.

Rather it may be

only a set of duties common to the Motor Vehicle Operators as
an "occupational group" without any specific reference to the
special duties thatmay be required of operators handling different types of vehicles enumerated under the General Statement.
But that is immaterial, because whether a job specification or
not, I cannot find it binding on the Library as a limitation on
the duties that may be assigned to the Bookmobile driver.
Moreover, if the Library was bound by the City's Motor
Vehicle Operator job description, its right set forth in Article
III (Management Clause) to determine "the methods, processes
and means of its operations including the introduction of new
methods and facilities and changes in existing methods and facilities ..." would be rendered meaningless.

The Management

Clause vests this right in the Library except as "expressly
modified by the written terms of this Agreement"
added).

(Emphasis

But I find nothing in the written contract which in-

cludes the City's job description, nor any provision making
that description applicable to the Bookmobile driver* Neither
that description nor its substance can be deemed a limitation
on the exercise of the Library's rights with regard to "methods,
processes, means of operation and facilities."
Had the Union been able to show that in approving or affixing the job title "Motor Vehicle Operator," and in appropriating money for its salary, the City of New York was unaware of

- 5 the disputed clerical duties required ot the Bookmobile driver,
I might have been inclined to find an implicit requirement of
consistency between the duties assigned, and those for which
money was appropriated.
But I do not find, at least after 1958, that the City was
unaware of the particular clerical work regularly assigned the
Bookmobile driver.

On September 15, 1958 a Motor Vehicle Oper-

ator acting as a driver for the Bookmobile completed a "Position
Classification Questionnaire" for the Bureau of Classification
and Compensation of the New York City Department of Personnel.
It included specific reference to and an explanation of most
if not all of the disputed clerical duties; indicating that
this took 63% of his time. So from 1958 on at least, the City
had notice, actual or constructive of the clerical duties
assigned to Bookmobile drivers, and related to the work of that
vehicle.

Consequently I cannot conclude that thereafter the

City appropriated funds for this job title without knowledge
that its duties differed from those of a Motor Vehicle Operator
employed by the City of New York.
I am persuaded that the announcement of May 16, 1969 was
nothing more than what the Library contends it purported to be a posting of vacancies in the job classification Motor Vehicle
Operator; a request for applications to fill those vacancies;
and a Summary of Duties common to all Motor Vehicle Operators
driving vehicles for the Library.

(The same posting included

similar information regarding the jobs of Special Officer and
Assistant Library Maintainer).

In short, I am not satisfied

that it meets the traditional test of a "job description."

- 6 That the "Summary of Duties" did not include the clerical
work assigned to the Bookmobile driver in no way misled the
Union or those employees from whom applications were sought.
The Union admits that for many years since the inception of the
Bookmobile, its driver has been required to perform these or
related clerical duties.

So by consistent past practice the

Union and those in the employ of the Library as of May 1969
knew or should have known that certain clerical work was part
of the Bookmobile driver assignment.

Indeed the Motor Vehicle

Operators who testified at the hearing stated that though they
were not told of those clerical duties when originally interviewed and hired, they were trained in the operation of the
Bookmobile including the clerical duties soon after employment,
and when assigned to the Bookmobile, performed those duties.
So on May 16, 1969 when the notice of staff vacancies was
disseminated to "All Staff" (i.e. those then in the Library's
employ) there is every reason to believe that the affected employees and the Union knew,by long practice, that any Motor
Vehicle Operator assigned to the Bookmobile would have to perform clerical duties specially related to that vehicle. Therefore, considering the fact that the notice of May 16, 1969 was
obviously for the purpose of advertising vacancies in the job
of Motor Vehicle Operator; was directed to employees then in
the Library's employ; and at the time it was posted no change
or variation in the long standing practice of assigning clerical work to the Motor Vehicle Operator driving the Bookmobile
had taken place, I cannot construe that posting as a "specifi-

- 7 cation" which eliminated those clerical tasks from the work
of the Bookmobile driver.
In the light of this long standing past practice, I do not
attach significance to the fact that Motor Vehicle Operators
when first hired or interviewed for those jobs, were not told
by the Library that clerical work would be assigned when they
drove the Bookmobile.

Any such omission was and has been cured

by the unvaried practice subsequent to their hiring.

They were

trained to operate the Bookmobile and to perform the clerical
work involved.

And for many years without variation performed

the disputed or similar clerical duties.
That this was known or should have been known to the Union
when it negotiated the current Collective Bargaining Agreement
effective June 6, 1969 cannot be seriously disputed.

If the

Union disagreed with the scope of the Bookmobile driver's job,
it should have negotiated either a specific job description or
limits on that job during the last negotiations.
In other words, because I find no contract violation by
the Library, I must conclude that the substance of this dispute
is a matter for negotiations and not arbitration.

"-^ «-^^^'--v^^^^t-*v^---c-^ I

Eric J/^Schmertz
Arbitrator

(J

In the Matter of the Proceedings
between
Carle Place Teachers' Association, Inc
and

Findings and
Recommendations

Carle place Board of Education

In accordance with Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970, the Undersigned was designated as the Mediator/Fact Finder "to study
and advise both parties as to what is the proper solution" to
a dispute involving the application and interpretation of
Article X Paragraph A of the contract.
A hearing was hied at the Carle Place High School in
Carle Place, New York on February 10, 1970.

Representatives

of the Carle Place Board of Education, hereinafter referred to
as the "Board" and the Carle Place Teachers' Association, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Association" appeared, and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Board and the

Association, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties"
expressly waived my oath of office.
The disputed contract section reads:
The Board of Education agrees to remain a participating member of the State Employees Health Insurance Program and will furnish 100% health coverage.
The Association contends that this provision obligates
the Board to pay the full cost of the "State wide plan" (basic
Blue Cross and Blue Shielf), or GHI, Or HIP, whichever is

- 2 selected by the participating teacher.

It is the Board's posi-

tion that the 100% health coverage" referred to above applies
only to the "State wide plan" and that the difference between
the cost of that plan and the higher cost of the GHI or HIP
options must be borne by the employee who selects either of
the latter two plans.
Based on the entire record before me I find the Association's contention to be contractually meritoreous.
Standing alone the wording of Article X Paragraph A
supports the Association's position.

Representatives of the

Board, who participated in the contract negotiations between
the parties, conceded at the hearing that the "State Employees
Health Insurance program" embodies three health insurance plans,
namely the "State wide plan (Blue Cross and Blue Shield), GHI
and HIP.

It follows then that if, as the contract provides,

the Board "will furnish 100% health coverage," all of the costs
of any or all three of the plans must be borne by the Board,
without any deductions from the pay of a participating employee.
This conclusion is further reinforced by juxtaposing
Article X Paragraph A with its counter part in the predecessor
contract between the parties.

The latter section (Article X)

read:
The Board of Education agrees to remain a participating member of the State Employees Health Insurance Program.
The Board of Education will furnish each employee
health coverage in the amount of $3.96 per month
and coverage of $5.97 per month for the family plan.
There is no dispute that under the predecessor contract
the above sums of money were granted not just to those employees

- 3 under the "State wide plan" but also those who had elected
the GHI or HIP option.

It is clear therefore, that by making

those specified sums of money available to defray the cost of
any of the three options the Board recognized that all three
plans were part of the "State Employees Health Insurance Program." And consequently, by changing Article X in the current
agreement, to provide for "100% Health Insurance Coverage" by
the Board, it must perforce mean that instead of paying a
specified sum of money toward the cost of any one of the three
options, the Board is now required to pay the full cost of
each of those plans.

Or in short, neither under the predecess-

or or current contract is there language or conduct which limits the application of Article X to the "State wide plan"
alone.
The Board asserts that during the most recent contract
negotiations it intended and informed the Association that the
100% Health Insurance Coverage was to apply only to the "State
wide plan," with the differential between the cost thereof and
the more expensive GHI and HIP options paid by the employees.
This may well have been the Board's intent, but I find no
basis upon which to impute such a limitation to the Association,
either by knowledge or acceptance.

Throughout the written con-

tract proposals submitted by the Association to the Board, is
the Association's consistent demand for "100% district paid
health insurance.1'

The Board's negotiated position, as eviden-

ced by the written counter proposals was first, a continuation
of Article X as it existed in the expired contract; then an
increase in the monthly employee and family coverage as re-

- 4 ferred to in Article X of the prior agreement and finally
acceptance of the Association's demand for 100% health insurance coverage to be paid by the district.

It seems to me

that if the Board intended only the "State wide plan" to be
paid for totally by the Board, the final "sign off" memorandum
dated April 23, 1969 and signed by Mr. Moehle, the Board's
chief Negotiator and Mr. LaBombard, the Association's President, would and should have expressed such a limitation.
it did not.

But

Rather, next to the total phrase "100% Health

Insurance" is written the word "agreed."

Moreover, assuming

arguendo that the "sign off" memorandum was in "short hand"
form, the Board's limitation of "100% of the cost" to the
"State wide plan" could and should have found its way into
the final written language of Article X Paragraph A of the
current agreement.

Again it did not0

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons it is my
finding that under Article X Paragraph A of the contract, the
Board is obligated to pay the full cost of either the "State
wide plan," GHI or HIP depending upon which plan an eligible
teacher selects.

Therefore those teachers who suffered de-

ductions from their pay to cover the costs of any of these
plans are entitled to reimbursement.

However, in those in-

stances where the Board enrolled a teacher earlier than as
provided under the terms and conditions of the particular plan,
the cost of early enrollment shall be borne by the teacher.
Therefore payroll deductions limited to the period of early
enrollment are not subject to reimbursement.

Eric &' Schmertz
Mediator and Fact
Finder

DATED: March
1970
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

) .
) " *'

On this
day of March, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the Individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

ICAH ARBIflATIOH A8SOCUTXOR, ADMINISTRAT01
ibor Arbitration tribunal

Matter of the Arbitration between
Central Islip Teachers Association
and

Award

Central Islip Board of Education
The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
Awards as follows$
The Association's request that a summer sabbatical
taken under Article XXII Paragraph A6 of the contract, be charged against the quota for the school
year only in proportion to the amount of the sabbatical exercised each summer, is denied.

Eric J* Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 3, 1970
STATE Of Hew York )8g .
C0UKTY 0? Hew York)
On this 3rd day of August, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Sehaert* to taoe known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case Ho. 1339 0513 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
t
Central Islip Teachers Association *
i
and
'
t
Central Islip Board of Education
'
i

Opinion

In accordance with Article IV of the contract dated July
1, 1969 to June 30, 1970 between Central Iclip Board of Education, hereinafter referred to as the "Board** and Central Islip
Teacher* Association,__ hereinafter referred to as the "association" the Undersigned mis selected as the sole Arbitrator to
hear and decide a dispute involving the application and inter*
oretation of certain sections of Article XXII of the contract.
A hearing was held at the offices of the Board on July 7,
1970 at which time representatives of the Association and the
Board, hereinafter referred to jointly as Che "parties/1
appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The parties seek a declaratory judgment on the question of
how a sabbatical leave taken under Paragraph A6 of Article XXII
should be charged against the quota set forth in Paragraph A4
of the same Article.
Paragraphs A4 and A6 read:
The number of sabbaticals shall be distributed from
the buildings within the District as follows; Three
(S) fro® the High School, one (1) from each Elementary
School and two (2) from Middle School and/or Junior
High School.
A teacher nay elect to take this sabbatical in the
following manner: The teacher will receive one third

•2 •
(l/3)o£ two thirds (2/5) of his annual salary for three
(3) consecutive summera for sabbatical leave as defined
herein* the teacher who elects this option will continue to accrue years toward his next sabbatical commenclng with his eighth year in the district. Any
teacher who elects to take the sabbatical leave provided for in this paragraph will be charged against
the overall quota for the school froa which he originates as provided in Section 4 of this Article,
It is clear that quotas set forth in A4 above are quotas
for each year.
The Association contends that sabbatical leaves taken under Paragraph A6 should be no less in quantity than available
under Paragraph' A4. it argues that inasmuch as a summer sabbatical under Paragraph M is equivalent to only one third of
a full year sabbatical, a sutaaer sabbatical should be charged
each year only one third against the quota or only in proportion to the percentage of a full sabbatical that the summer
leave represents. The Association points out that because the
quotas referred to in Paragraph A4 are undisputedly full year
sabbatical leaves* three teachers, not just one should be allowed summer sabbaticals at the same or during overlapping times
as the equal of one teacher taking a full year off under Paragraph A4«
the Board, relying on the express language of Paragraph
A6 asserts that a summer sabbatical, albeit equivalent to one
third of a full year sabbatical, is properly chargeable as a
full sabbatical each year against the quota set forth in Paragraph A4, And that this is the correct interpretation of
Paragraph Ad even if it means that a sabbatical during the
suwfier months, when no replacement is necessary, is significantly less expensive for the Board than the one full year

- 3sabbatical of the Paragraph A4 quota. It asserts in contrast,
however that a summer sabbatical is more desirable and attractive to the teachers.
There is no question but that a sabbatical under paragraph
A6 is of lesser duration than a sabbatical under Paragraph A4;
and that if each are treated alike as a charge against the
quota, a teacher electing to take his sabbatical one third
each summer for three consecutive summers under Paragraph A6,
will reduce the quota of full year sabbaticals by one full sabbatical each year.
That this is viewed as an inequity by the Association is
manifest in its grievance.

But inequitable or not I find the

Board's view supported by the provisions of Article XXII of
the contract. The last sentence of Paragraph A 6 readst
Any teacher who elects to take the sabbatical leave
provided for in this paragraph will be charged
against the overall quota for the school from which
he originates as provided in Section 4 of this
Article. (Emphasis added)*
By express reference to Section 4, the word "quota11 means
the amount authorised each year. And the parties deliberately
use the word "overall" which by dictionary definition means
covering or including everything. (The Random House Dictionary
of the English Language - Unabridged Edition). The only logical interpretation is that the sabbatical leave taken under
Paragraph A&, albeit at one third each summer, shall be contractually deemed equivalent to an overall or full sabbatical
each year, and so chargeable against the Paragraph A4 yearly
quota.
For if the parties intended the summer sabbatical of one

third each year to be charged against the quota as one third
or in proportion to the amount of tine actually taken, they
could have easily so provided in Paragraph A6, Indeed they
made such provision for a proportionate charge against the
total quota in Paragraph A3 @£ Article XXII. In that section
a sabbatical leave of half a year is expressly charged against
the Paragraph A4 quota "as one half." So the parties knew
how to write contract language calling for a proportionate
charge against the quota, and surely would have done the same
*•

in the very next section, had they intended it to be so applied.
But they did not, and therefore isust have intended something
different.
If this conclusion produces an inequitable result, or one not
intended by the Association, it is only a reflection of the
contract language bargained by and between the parties, especially the glaring absence in Paragraph 6, of language loandating a proportional charge against the yearly quota, as is
found in the immediately preceding Paragraph 5. And it is to
the contract that the Arbitrator is bound even if he oay think
tjae contract should be different.

He may only enforce the con-

tract as written, not change it. Changes are for negotiation
and not for arbitration*

Erie J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

i
In the Matter of the Arbitration between '
i
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Pension Fund; '
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health &
'
Welfare Fund
'
i
and
'
i
Cordi Garage
'
i

Award

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties at a hearing on April 17, 1970, renders the following Award:
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund
for the month of January, 1970, the sum of $1,190.61.
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund
for the month of February, 1970, the sum of $1,053.97.
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund
for the month of March, 1970, the sum of $1,213.40.
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund for the month of January, 1970, the sum of
$2,777.99.
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund for the month of February, 1970, the sum of
$2,459.28.
Cordi Garage owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund for the month of March, 1970, the sum of
$2,831.25
The foregoing sums are past due. Cordi is therefore
directed to pay the aforesaid sums to the respective
Funds with interest forthwith.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
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DATED:

May

1970

STATE OF New York )Ss.s
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Award
and
Opinion

DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Company required to pay negative rates for the
processing of the present type of internegative film
such as Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm),
and 72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive developing machines?
A hearing was held at the Company on March 31, 1970 at
which time representatives of the Company and Union appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's oath and the contract time limit for the rendition of
the Award were waived.
Based on the record I conclude that in processing and use,
the present type of internegative film referred to in the stipulated issue has characteristics of both positive and negative
developing.
But this fact, which in my judgment makes it a film that
squares exclusively with neither negative nor positive developing, points up the overriding fact that it is a film materially
unique unto itself.
Accordingly I can find no more basis for it to be treated
as negative developing, at the higher negative rate, than as

- 2 -

part of the positive developing process, where it is presently located.
But based on "past practice" I shall leave it where I
find it, namely as part of the color positive developing machines at the regular rate of pay for those machines.

I do so

because this has been the practice for a number of years with
regard to this type of film, during which time contracts
were negotiated by the parties.

It seems to me that because

of the special characteristics of this type of film, a determination as to which rate of pay should obtain and where the
developing work is to be performed, should have been specially negotiated in those contracts, if its location, methods
of processing and pay were to be changed.
In other words I am satisfied that a change in what has
been a practice for a number of years of processing this
type of film on the color positive developing machines at the
color positive developing rate (which has required little or
no change in the technical methods or operations of those
machines from what is required to develop regular color positive prints) is a matter for negotiation between the parties
and not arbitration.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, renders the following Award:
The grievance is denied. The Company is not required to pay negative rates for the processing
of the present type of internegative film such as
Eastman Kodak 72-71 (16 mm) and 52-71 (35 mm) and
72-70 (16 mm) and 52-70 (35 mm) on color positive
developing machines.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the^Union.
Eric JVSchmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
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DATED: May

1970

STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Case No. 70A-1

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
Award
and
DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the rate for the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine?
Hearings were held at the Laboratory on January 12, 1970
and at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on
February 16, 1970, at which time representatives of the above
named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was waived as was the con-

tract time limit for the rendition of the Award.

Both parties

filed post hearing briefs.
The machine in question is admittedly "new" within the
meaning of Section 17(c) of the contract, and hence the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the rate of pay.
For a number of reasons set forth in its presentation and
brief, the Union contends that the operator of this machine is
entitled to 65£ an hour above the present contract Group 5
rate.

The Company's position is that the machine warrants no

more than the present Group 5 rate for a color printer, namely $4.01 an hour.
Based on the entire record before me, together with my

- 2 observation of the operation of the machine in question; the
duties performed by the operator of that machine; and my observation of other color printing machines in the Laboratory,
I am not persuaded that the operation of the Hollywood Reduction Color Printing Machine and the duties of the operator in
connection therewith are significantly more complex, more demanding or of a more responsible nature than what is presently
expected of the operators of other color printing machines for
which the Group 5 rate is paid.

Of course, because the machine

in question is new, it contains certain indigenous
and differences from other color printing machines.

variations
But I am

not satisfied that these differences or variations are of a
magnitude to justify a higher rate of pay.
The Arbitrator's fee and the hearing room expense shall
be borne by the Union.

Eric J/ S c h m e r t z f
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April
1970
STATE OF New York
)sg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

-
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
Award

and

DeLuxe General, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
I find that prior to reconstruction of the takeup system on the dry end, the complement of the
#13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing
Machine when operating two strands was five men0
Accordingly, the present complement shall be five
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric A. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: April
1970
STATE OF New York
)Ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of April, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 70A-2

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DeLuxe General, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Shall there be a change in the present complement
of the #13 and #14 Black and White Positive Developing Machines as a result of the reconstruction
of the take-up system on the dry end when operating two strands?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on February 18, 1970
at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for rendition of the Award.

Both sides filed post hear-

ing briefs0
Because of the reconstruction of the take-up system on
the dry end, the parties agree that this case falls within
Section 17 (c) of the contract.
However, as I see it, there is a subsidiary but threshold question about which the parties are in dispute.

And that

is over what the complement on the disputed machine was prior
to the reconstruction.

An answer to this threshold question

will be determinative of the basic issue in dispute, simply because both sides argue that the present complement should be
no different from what it was prior to the reconstruction.

- 2 The Union claims that a crew of five men previously operated the machines when two strands were run.
asserts that the crew was four.

The Company

(At present, subsequent to

the reconstruction and pending the outcome of this case, the
crew is four.)
On these different premises the Union asserts that there
is nothing about the reconstruction which would justify a reduction in the crew complement from five to four; and the
Company argues that because the reconstruction simplified the
operation there is no reason why the complement should be increased from four (prior reconstruction), to five0
The weight of the evidence presented at the hearing, including testimony by Company witnesses, supports the Union's
claim that the crew complement prior to reconstruction was five
(two on the wet end; two on the dry end and a bridge-man for
relief.)

Therefore, since the positions of both sides in this

case rest on their respective but differing contentions regarding the prior crew complement, it follows that the present
crew complement on the machine in question, when operating two
strands, should be five.
Moreover, I am persuaded that a crew complement of five is
proper because, despite the thoroughly plausible contention of
the Company that the reconstruction simplified the mechanical
operation of the machines (though I was unable to make a comparison because the old take-up system has been abandoned and
abolished) I find no difference now, in the amount of time that
wet and dry operators require or are entitled to relief, from

-

- 3 those circumstances prior to reconstruction.

The same rest

breaks, meal periods and personal needs obtain as before, and
a fifth crew member is needed, in part at least to cover in
those situations.

In short, the reconstruction of the dry

end take-up system did not change the prior need for or use
of the bridge-man, whom I have found to have been the fifth
crew member prior to reconstruction.

7
^J./ Schmertz "
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

De Luxe General Incorporated
and

'
'
i

FINDINGS AND AWARD
CASE #7AQ4

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory '
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO1

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD
1. On November 17, 1970 a dispute arose over the manning
of the striping machine and the performance of striping work. As a consequence, and one orders of the Union,
the Developers in the Developing Department interrupted
regular production and engaged in a work stoppage within the meaning and proscription of Section 15(h) of the
contract, by putting up "leader" on the Developing
machines. This violated Section 15(h) of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
2. The Union must bear responsibility for placing the
Developers in a position which caused their suspension
by the Company. Therefore the Union is responsible for
the duration of time between the beginning of the stoppage
and the employees' return to productive work--approximately two hours. The Union's defense of "lockout" is rejected. The Company is entitled to receive from the Union,
as ordinary damages, the amount of wages paid and welfare
and pension benefits credited to the Developers during
that period of time. Accordingly the Union shall pay the
Company the sum of three hundred dollars and fifty-four
cents ($300.54).
3. I am not persuaded that the expenses incurred by the
Company in shipping striping work to the West Coast and
receiving it back was an inexorable consequence of that
stoppage. While I understand the Company's decision
as a matter of prudence, in view of my rulings at the
first hearing I cannot conclude that the handling of
striping work at the Company would again have been
interrupted or refused by the employees or the Union.
Therefore the Company's claim for money damages arising
from its decision to have striping work done on the
West Coast, is denied.

-24. Pending the final determination of any dispute between
the parties, including disputes arising from the temporary transfer clause, other contract provisions, oral
agreements, and the meaning and application or alleged
breaches of the "status quo" of Section 15(h), the
Union and the employees may not engage in strikes, slowdowns, work stoppages, cessations of work or other interferences with normal production during the life of this
contract. Section 15(h) expressly forbids such action.
Even a breach of the "status quo" by the Company does
not justify such action. And therefore I need not determine in this proceeding whether there was such a breach.
The proper procedure in the case of any dispute is to
process a claim through the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. The arbitration forum is
fully adequate to fashion appropriate remedies and orders
in the event of any violations.
5. Therefore as a response to a dispute during the life of
this collective agreement, a strike, or any action which
falls within that definition by the Union and/or the
employees, just as is a "lockout" by the Company, is
totally unnecessary as well as prohibited by the contract
and this AWARD. Also, pending the determination of any
dispute under the procedures of Section 15, the parties
are required to maintain the "working conditions or
methods of operation as they existed prior to the dispute
except as they may be otherwise permitted by (the)
Agreement". Henceforth, in the adjustment of disputes,
the parties shall follow and comply with the provisions
of Section 15 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
6. The Arbitrator's fee totalling $600.00 shall be borne
2/3rds by the Union ($400), and l/3rd by the Company
($200).

Eric J/ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: December 14th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this fourteenth day of December 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

DeLuxe General Incorporated
and

'
'
i

FINDINGS AND AWARD
CASE #70AQ5

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory '
Film Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO1

The Undersigned, as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, makes the
following FINDINGS and AWARD:
1. In virtually all instances, vacancies which the Company
decides to fill in the skilled classifications are
filled by employees referred to the Company by the
Union; or are filled from other sources after the
Union has been asked to refer candidates and is unable to do so because none with that skill are on
layoff or available.
2. The foregoing has represented a realistic business
judgement by the Company and a procedure in furtherance
of sound labor relations. For both reasons I recommend
it be continued wherever possible.
3. However I do not find that the Company is required to
follow the foregoing procedure under the Contract. The
two Sections upon which the Union relies are not applicable. The effectiveness of the pertinent part of Section
l(e) awaits the happening of a condition precedent. And
under the facts in the instant case Section 25 does not
bind the Company to the provisions of Article 27 Section
l(a) of the Union's By-Laws. Therefore, the hiring of
Mr. F. Giovanelli by the Company is not and would not
be violative of the Collective Agreement.
4. There is evidence that the Union committed two ad hoc and
temporary violations of my AWARD of December 14, 1970 in
case #70AQ4, and threatened one additional violation.
I reiterate that AWARD, and as stated therein, direct
compliance for the balance of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. I choose not to consider imposing damages or
penalties in this case because I have not previously
given notice that such remedies would be applicable.
Rather I shall make use of this case to serve notice that
as Permanent Arbitrator I expect my orders and Awards to
be strictly followed. Willful failures or refusals to
do so will hereafter be subject to damages, both ordinary
and punitive.

-2Much of this case including a ruling on the "status
quo" is in the nature of a Declaratory Judgement.
Accordingly the Arbitrator's total fee of four
hundred and fifty dollars ($450.) shall be shared
equally by the parties.

Eric J/'Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: December 28th, 1970
STATE OF New York ) s s _ .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty eighth day of December 1970, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

and

Award and
Opinion

DeLuxe General, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative
to positive developing a violation of his seniority
rights? If so what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on March 18, 1971,
at which time Mr. Lamendola, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
This proceeding is in the nature of a "declaratory judgment" to determine which of two employees, the grievant or
Robert Twilley (who was also present at the hearing) is entitled to a single available negative developing job.
The answer turns on whether Twilley, who concededly had
more seniority than the grievant as a negative developer,
i

abandoned or relinquished that seniority. I conclude he did

not.
While working as a negative developer Twilley became ill
and underwent a serious operation.

Upon his return to work,

at his request, and in apparent recognition of his need for a

» 2period of recuperation, he was permitted to work at the less
demanding task of positive developing, though he retained his
negative developing classification and the higher rate of pay
of that classification. This arrangement was agreed to by the
Union and Company and confirmed in a letter dated April 22,
1969 from Mr. Quigley to Mr. Vitello. Though that letter states
that Twilley "will return to negative developing when the first
opening occurs," I am satisfied the parties intended to allow
him to remain in positive developing until his health permitted
him to return to the more difficult negative developing work.
Therefore unless it can be established that Twilley was physically capable of assuming the negative developing Job on a full
time basis when first, one, and then a second job opening for
that classification was posted, his failure to bid in each instance cannot be deemed prejudicial to his seniority rights as
a negative developer.
The evidence in the record does not support a conclusion
that at the time those two openings were posted the grievant
had sufficiently recovered from his illness to resume work in
that classification on a full time basis.

It is undisputed

that at that time, and at the request of the Company he did
perform assignments as a negative developer, on a straight
time and overtime basis, and he concedes also that he worked
occasional "double shifts." But he also testified, without refutation, that it was very difficult physically for him to do so;
that he was not fully able to perform that work on a regular
continuing basis; and that he did it out of a sence of obligation to the Company because it had allowed him to retain his

- 3negative developing classification and rate of pay while working as a positive developer during his recuperation.

I find no

reason why his explanation and characterization of his physical
condition at the time he willingly undertook negative developing
assignments, should not be believed and accepted.
Also, though I appreciate the grievant's equitable argument
that he should not have been removed from negative developing to
make room for Twilley after the latter passed up two posted
openings in that classification, I find no contractual reason
why Twilley was obliged to either bid for those openings or
claim those jobs in order to keep his seniority as a negative
developer. While Twilley worked as a positive developer, he retained the negative developing classification and the higher
rate. So there was no need for him to seek a classification or
rate of pay which he already enjoyed.

Also it is undisputed

that job postings are promotional in nature - from a lower to a
higher classification, rather than to a specific Job opening.
So, put another way, because Twilley remained classified at the
higher negative developing level there was no "promotion" for
him to seek or claim.
This is not to say that an employee, ready and able to
assume regular work in a higher classification to which his
seniority attaches, cannot abandon his seniority rights to
that position by failing to claim job openings when they occur.
Rather it is that I do not find that the particular facts in
this case can be interpreted to have reached that point.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator un-

- 4der the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
Because Robert Twilley had neither abandoned nor
waived his seniority rights as a negative developer, the transfer of Philip Lamendola from negative to positive developing was not a violation
of Mr. Lamendola1s seniority rights.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by
the parties.

T

~y***+^\c j. Schmer

Permanent Arbitrator

BASED: April 12, 1971
STATE OF New York ) ,
CGUUTY OF Mew York) " *
On this 12th day of April, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual desxribed in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Cas No. 70 A-13

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY
INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, IATSE, AFL-CIO
and

DeLuxe General, Inc.

'
'
i
'
'
'
'
'
'
i

Award
and
Opinion

The stipulated issue is:
Was Anthony Caleca improperly reassigned? Was he
improperly reduced in his rate by 16$ an hour?
If so what shall be the remedy in connection with
both questions?
Hearings were held at the Company offices on July 30 and
September 8, 1970 at which time Mr. Caleca, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Company and Union appeared, and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived.
I find nothing in the contract which prohibits the Company from changing an employee's duties or assigning him from
one set of duties to another within the same job classification.
I find that the work which the grievant performed first in
the Finishing Department; then on the VPI account; and after
his removal from the VPI account, all fell within the Checker
B job classification.

So I find nothing contractually improp-

er about his involuntary transfer from the VPI account to

- 2 other work within the same classification.
It is undisputed that while on the VPI account the grievant received 16<? an hour above the Checker B rate, and that
this increase in pay was unilaterally granted by the Company
because of the importance which it attached to that account.
The additional 16£ an hour was not an increase jointly negotiated by the Company and the Union.

Therefore, as a bonus

attached to that particular job, unilaterally by the Company,
I see no reason why the Company could not delete it from an
employee's pay when the employee no longer worked on the VPI
account, provided the affected employee continued to receive
at least the contractual Checker B rate for other work to
which he was assigned in that classification.
And that was the situation here.

While the grievant

worked on the VPI account he enjoyed the higher rate of pay
unilaterally granted by the Company.

When he was reassigned

to other duties within the Checker B classification, the Company reduced his pay by 16£ an hour, but continued to pay him
at the Checker B rate.
Had the additional 16<; an hour been jointly negotiated
by the parties, it would then have assumed the status of a
contract rate and the affected employee would have enjoyed the
protection of Section 4 Paragraph (c) of the contract.

But

because I find that Section of the contract applicable to contract

rates or rates negotiated or mutually agreed to by the

parties, the additional 16<i an hour involved in the instant
case is not "wages over the prior base rate" within the mean-

ing of that Section.

Accordingly the grievant's reduction in

- 3 pay by 16£ an hour was not improper.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
makes the following AWARD:
Anthony Caleca was not improperly reassigned nor
was he improperly reduced in rate by 16^ an hour.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Union.

Eric jti. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October ^

1970

STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York) " "
On this ^ day of October, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 70A-8

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians, Local 702 I 0 A.T 0 S 0 E £
and

Award

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The proper rate for the Bell & Howell panel printer
shall be 300 above the group 5 rate when the machine is operated at a speed of over 180 and up to
and including 240 feet per minute. Eligible employees shall be so paid retroactively for the period of
time that the machine has run under that condition.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: January
1970
STATE OF New York
)ss.COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of January, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 69A 21

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Motion Picture Laboratories Film
Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T0S0E0

'
'

and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

'
i

Opinion

i

As Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the above named parties, the following stipulated issue was submitted to me for determination:
What is the proper rate for the Bell & Howell
panel printers?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on December 22,
1969 at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time
limit for the rendition of the Award.
After a review of the entire record I conclude, consistent with my oral observations at the conclusion of the hearing, that under Section 17(c) of the contract Duart is obliged
to pay the same base wage rate for the operation of this machine as the Union previously negotiated at other laboratories
under the same contract, namely 30£ above the Group 5 rate
when the machine is run at a speed over 180 and up to and including 240 feet a minute.
There is no dispute that the Bell & Howell panel printer
is "new equipment" within the meaning of Section 17(c) of the
contract.

There is also no dispute that the same equipment

- 2 is in operation at certain other laboratories under this contract, and that subsequent to the effective date of the contract the Union negotiated the aforementioned

rate of pay

for the operation of this machine at those other laboratories.
With these factors undisputed I find that Section 17(c)
of the contract mandates the same wage rate for the same operation of the machine at DuArt.
of Section 17(c) to be clear.

I find the meaning and intent
When a piece of new equipment

is installed the parties are to negotiate the wages and conditions with respect thereto„

Failing to agree within the

specified period of time, unresolved questions of wages and/
or conditions may be referred to the Arbitrator.

But if the

same equipment either existed in other laboratories under
this contract when the contract was entered into, or installed in other laboratories "hereafter" (or in other words during the term of this contract), any base wage rate agreed to
by the Union and that Employer is thereafter applicable to
all other employers under the contract who subsequently, during the term of this contract, install the same new equipment
in their laboratories.
The facts in the instant case square precisely with the
circumstances covered by Section 17(c) of the contract. After
the effective date of the current agreement, this type of
equipment was installed at Movielab, DeLuxe, VPI and other
labs.

And the Union negotiated a rate of 30<; above the

Group 5 rate when the machine ran at a speed over 180 and up
to and including 240 feet a minute.
*~

Subsequently, the same

new equipment, to be run at the same speed, was installed at

- 3 DuArt, giving rise to the instant dispute.

Consequently I can

reach no conclusion other than that DuArt must pay the same
rate as the others.
I am persuaded that my conclusions in this case are in
accord with the purpose and intent for which a master Collective Bargaining Agreement was negotiated.

I am satisfied that

the single contract, applicable equally to all covered Employers, was intended to insure uniformity

of conditions, wages

and practices between and amongst the Union and those employees,,

Distinctions, if any, are set forth expressly within

that Agreement.

But Section 17 (c) clearly applies to all. And

it does so I believe, in order to insure that the rate of pay
for new equipment, operating in the same manner, should be
the same throughout the Industry, so that no laboratory can obtain an unfair competitive advantage or indeed be placed at a
competitive disadvantage with regard to wages paid for the
same work0

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New Haven Federation of Teachers,
Local 933, American Federation of
Teachers, AFL-CIO
Award

and
New Haven Board of Education

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated January 17, 1969 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The Board of Education did not violate the contract
by scheduling and holding a summer school session
of 29 days rather than 30 during the summer of 1969.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 6, 1970
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF

)sg .
)

On this 6th day of January, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 12 30 0168-69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
New Haven Federation of Teachers,
Local 933, American Federation of
Teachers, AFL-CIO
and
New Haven Board of Education

In accordance with Article III Section 2 Step 5 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 17, 1969 between New Haven Board of Education, hereinafter referred to
as the "Board," and New Haven Federation of Teachers, Local
933, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Federation," the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue;
Did the Board violate the contract by scheduling
and holding a summer school session of 29 days
rather than 30 during the summer of 1969? If so,
what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held in the offices of the Board in New
Haven, Connecticut on December 9, 1969, at which time representatives of the Federation and Board, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly, and in writ-

ing, waived the Arbitrator's oath.
Material to this dispute is Article XVI Section 8, subparagraph (e) which in pertinent part reads:

- 2 The Board shall determine annually whether a
summer school is to be held. If such is held
the following conditions will prevail.

(e) A full summer school session shall
be thirty (30) working days.
The Federation contends that the summer session of 1969
which encompassed 29 paid days violated the foregoing contract
provision.

It seeks an additional day's pay for each teacher

who worked that summer session.
The Board asserts that as a matter of contract application and interpretation, the foregoing clause only precludes
the scheduling of a summer session in excess of 30 working
days, but in no way limits the Board's right to unilaterally
schedule a summer session of a lesser number of days.

Alter-

natively, the Board contends that the Federation, through its
President and other officials, was notified of, agreed to or
at the very least acquiesced in the 1969 summer session of 29
days.

And that such constituted a contract modification.
The Federation interprets Article XVI Section 8, sub-

paragraph (e) as meaning that the summer school session may
not be less than 30 working days.

Or in other words, if the

Board determines that a summer school session shall be held,
its length is contractually mandated at 30 days, no
no less.

more and

The Federation President denies that he consented to

or acquiesced in a 29 day summer session for the year 1969,
asserting additionally that he lacks the authority to bind
the Federation or any of its members to any such arrangement
even if he had agreed.

Moreover the Federation argues that

- 3 any changes in contract provisions, and hence any modification in the foregoing contract clause must be initiated by
written request in accordance with Article XVIII Section 2
of the contract, and that no such written request was made
of the Federation by the Board in this casea
I accept the Board's contract interpretation of Article
XVI Section 8, sub-paragraph (e) and therefore need not decide whether the Federation President or any other Federation
official effectively agreed to a modification of the contract
or had the authority to do so.
To my mind the phrase "full summer school session" found
in sub-paragraph (e) means a summer session of a maximum of
30 working days.

The dictionary definition of the word "full"

is; complete measure; utmost extent; having within its limits
all that it can contain. (Webster's Universal Unabridged
Dictionary).
If as the Federation contends, a summer school session is
unalterably fixed by contract at 30 working days, I fail to
see why the parties would have included the word "full" in
sub-paragraph (e), because under such an interpretation, that
word would be wholly superfluous.

Moreover, if a summer

session may not be less than 30 days, or, in other words if
30 days is an irreducible minimum, the inclusion of the word
"full," denoting as it does a maximum quantity, would be manifestly erroneous.

I am satisfied that the parties did not

negotiate the inclusion of the word "full" for either an
erroneous or superfluous purpose.

Rather,! am convinced

- 4that the word "full" was included for an express purpose and
intent - to place a limit on the maximum number of days that
the Board could schedule a summer session, so as to protect
the teachers from summer sessions of excessive lengths.
In short, by its own language, it places an upper limit
on the length of a summer session; but implicit, and unrestricted, is the right of the Board to schedule a summer
session, with proper notice, of a lesser number of days.
Of some significance in further support of this conclusion is the fact that teachers working summer sessions are
paid on a per diem basis in accordance with individual contracts.

To me this clearly suggests some flexibility and

potential variation in the total number of scheduled days
for a summer session.

For if the summer session is mandated

rigidly at 30 days, I see no reason why the pay of the teachers would be calculated upon a daily basis„

Instead a flat

total sum would have been fixed (with appropriate deductions
for those scheduled days a teacher may miss).
I conclude that the per diem rate of pay for a summer
session is evidence of some recognized leeway in the overall
scheduling.

And in the face of the maximum limitation of 30

working days as fixed by Article XVI Section 8, sub-paragraph
(e), that leeway must be downward from 30.
Accordingly I find no violation of the contract by the
scheduling and holding of a summer school session of 29 days
rather than 30 during the summer of 1969.

Eric ty Schmertz
Arbitrator

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Long Island Division Local 923
R.W.D.S.U., AFL-CIO

'
'
i
'
'
Award

and
Dubbings Electronics, Inc.

'
t
'
i

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated May 1, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The Company had the right to suspend operations
for inventory purposes on November 21 and 22,
1969.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March
1970
STATE OF New York
)ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of March, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. A70-7

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Long Island Division Local 923
R.W.D.S.U., AFL-CIO
Opinion

and
Dubbings Electronics, Inc.

In accordance with Section 19 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 1, 1968 between Dubbings Electronics,
Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Long Island
Division Local 923, R.W.D.S0U., AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred
to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company have the right to suspend operations
for inventory purposes on November 21 and 22, 1969?
If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the office of the New York State
Board of Mediation on March 19, 1970 at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

oath.
The Union contends that the inventory conducted on Friday,
November 21 and Saturday November 22 deprived a substantial
number of bargaining unit employees of work on those days because the regular plant operation was shut down.

It does not

I protest, in this proceeding, the manner by which some bargaining unit employees were assigned to work on the inventory those
days.

- 2 The Union claims that to take inventory on days when normal
plant production would otherwise have been scheduled is contrary
to past practice; violative of the basic work week provisions
of the contract (Section 4); and not a layoff within the meaning of Section 7 'c) of the contract.
The Company does not allege that those employees who did
not work on November 21 and 22 were laid off.

Rather it asserts

that the inventory was an essential business activity; that it
had to be scheduled over a two day period in lieu of normal
production because inventory taken in prior years during nonregular plant operation hours proved totally unsatisfactory
to the Company auditors; and that the work week provision of
the contract does not constitute a guarantee which may not be
curtailed by a bonafide business need such as an inventory.
As neither side claims the curtailment of regular work
on November 21 and 22 to be a layoff of those employees not
scheduled to work on the inventory, Section 7(c)of the contract
is not in dispute and hence not applicable.
I am satisfied that Section 4 of the contract, which provides for a basic work week of 40 hours consisting of five consecutive days of work Monday to Friday inclusive, is not an
absolute guarantee.

It is well settled that guaranteed periods

of employment must be explicitly spelled out by clear and express language.

Otherwise, a basic work week is deemd to be

the "normal" work week, subject to curtailment by a number of
circumstances, such as machine breakdowns, Acts of God, lack
of material or bonafide business activities other than normal

- 3production.

Indeed, Section 5 of this contract which guaran-

tees four hours pay in the event that an employee is called
in or reports in for work, clearly contemplates the possibility that a full day's work on any given day may be diminished,
or cancelled in its entirety.

Thus by language and intent,

Section 5 negates any conclusion that Section 4 represents a
guarantee of five days work of eight hours each for each week
without exception„
There can be no serious dispute over the fact that an
annual inventory is a business necessity.

This Company is

publicly owned and an audit of its inventory is mandated by
the law.

The only question is whether the Company was obliged

to take the inventory on a day or at a time that would not
cause a suspension of normal production or operation.
clude that the Company was not so obligated.

I con-

That it did so

in prior years is not controlling because the inventories then
(which were conducted after working hours or began on Saturday)
were sharply criticized by the auditors for inaccuracies and
incompleteness, and, as the quantity of the inventory grew,
the time required encroached on normal operations anyway - by
requiring a completion on the following Monday, a normal working day.

The record indicates, without dispute, that the in-

ventory for 1969 grew substantially in quantity over the prior
years, warranting at least two days of work.

Moreover, the

accounting firm which certifies the accuracy of the inventory
directed the Company to conduct its inventory over a two day
period, and during normal working time.

The auditors did so

in order to obviate conditions which in prior years produced

- 4marginal if not unsatisfactory inventories.
So for these reasons I must conclude that enough justifiable factors existed to make proper the Company's decision to
shift the taking of inventory, an undisputed business need,
from non-regular working hours, to a day and time during the
regular work week0

And as the contract does not provide for

a guaranteed work week, those employees not called in to work
on the inventory on November 21 and 22, 1969, are not entitled
to pay for those days0

EricJK Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America,
Local 467, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Thomas A. Edison Industries
McGraw Edison Company

In accordance with Article XIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 6, 1970 between Thomas A. Edison
Industries, McGraw Edison Company, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company" and International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers of America, Local 467, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the position currently held by Angelina A. Sena
(hereinafter referred to as the "grievanf'Junder
the composite job of Floor Inspector (B-18-16)
properly rated under the "Job Rating Plan?" If
not how shall it be rated. If the Arbitrator finds
for the Union, he will then decide, following an
additional hearing or briefs, the matter of retroactivity, if any.
A hearing was held at the Company plant in West Orange,
New Jersey, on October 5, 1970 at which time representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
I deny the Company's threshold contention that the dispute

is not arbitrable.

There is no evidence that a prior grievance

covering the same complaint and involving the same grievant was

- 2 withdrawn by the Union with prejudice.

Also there is nothing

in the contract fixing a time limit within which the Union
must grieve a job evaluation factor(s) after a job has been
rated under the Job Rating Plan.

The traditional theory of

"laches" may be applicable to damages or retroactivity

(which

may be before me at a later date) but has no bearing on arbitra
bility.

Additionally I do not find the Award of Arbitrator

Benjamin C. Roberts of April 19, 1957 to be res adjudica to
the instant issue.

Mr. Roberts had before him and ruled only

on the factor of Experience, which is not a factor presently
in dispute.
On the merits the Union challenges the factors of Responsibility for Safety of Others and Working Conditions.

Both

are presently rated in the 3rd degree under the Job Rating
Plan.

The Union contends that both should be rated in the

4th degree.
The job of Floor Inspector (B-18-60) is a composite job
divided into three separate sets of duties.

The grievant

has been performing one of those sets of duties and two other
inspectors respectively the other two.

Based on the record

before me, including my observation of the three sets of
duties, I am persuaded that the 1/3 segment of the composite
job performed by the grievant is significantly different, at
least as to one of the factors in dispute, from the balance
of the composite job classification.

On the other hand if

the job of Floor Inspector is considered as a totality (the
three sets of duties on a composite basis) the less desirable aspects of the work performed by the grievant is offset

- 3 by the less onerous nature of the balance of the total job
classification.
The foregoing conclusion, applied to the issue in dispute,
means that on a composite basis, considering the Floor Inspector classification as a totality, I find the factors of Responsibility for Safety of Others and Working Conditions to be
properly rated in the 3rd degree.

And if each of the three

Inspectors are rotated amongst the three sets of duties, thereby exposing them equally to the undesirable and then more favorable aspects of the job, the present ratings for both disputed factors would be proper for each incumbent in the composite job classification.
But treated separately - where each Inspector serves continuously in only one of the three sets of duties - the Working Conditions presently applicable to that phase of the job
performed by the grievant in the screw machine area are markedly more unpleasant than the Working Conditions of the other
two Inspectors.

And it is that factor - Working Conditions,

which I find significantly different in considering the work
required of the grievant as compared with the other two segments of the job classification performed by the other two
Inspectors.
As to the factor of Responsibility for Safety of Others,
I find no significant difference between what is required of
the grievant in the screw machine area and that of the other
two Inspectors.

And I find that the 3rd degree under the

Job Rating Plan for the factor Responsibility for Safety of

- 4Others is correct both on a composite basis and if the job is
segmented into three parts.
But the factor of Working Conditions is different.

The

two other Inspectors not involved in the instant case, perform
duties under Working Conditions of less than the 4th degree.
But the location of the grievant's set of duties is in an area
markedly more unpleasant.

I find the requirement that she

regularly performed most of her duties in the screw machine
area without rotation into the job duties of the other two
Inspectors, exposes her "continuous(ly) to several disagreeable elements" within the meaning of the 4th degree of Working
Conditions under the applicable Job Rating Plan.

As distin-

guished from the other two Inspectors the grievant is continuously exposed to a high level of noise and to disagreeable
dirt, dust, oil, chemicals and heat, indigenous to the screw
machine area.

So long as she is confined to those duties on

a regular and continuing basis, she fails to enjoy the overall
or composite Working Conditions of the total Floor Inspector
job.

Or in short, she is not given the opportunity of period-

ic relief from those unfavorable working conditions by rotation into the more desirable working areas of the other two
sets of duties of the Floor Inspector

classification.

Accordingly I consider it improper and unfair that she be
accorded the credit of only the 3rd degree when she does not
experience that portion of the Working Conditions which are
alleviating in nature.
Therefore it is my determination that if the three Floor
Inspectors are regularly rotated among the three sets of duties

- 5 of the composite job of Floor Inspector, the factors of Working Conditions and Responsibility for Safety of Others would
be properly rated, as at present, in the 3rd degree under the
Job Rating Plan.

But if the grievant is confined to the screw

machine area, without equal opportunity to work on the sets of
duties performed by the other two Inspectors, the factor of
Working Conditions for her segment of the job shall be increased to the 4th degree.
In either event, the factor of Responsibility

for Safety

of Others is properly rated in the 3rd degree.
Upon the application of either of both parties, I will
either schedule a hearing or fix a date for submission of
briefs on the matter of retroactive pay, if any.

Eric J. Schmertz
ArbitZrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America
Local 467, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Thomas A. Edison Industries
McGraw Edison Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated January 6, 1970 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards
as follows:
The issue is arbitrable. If the three Inspectors
are regularly rotated among the three sets of duties
of the composite job of Floor Inspector, the factors
of Working Conditions and Responsibility for Safety
of Others would be properly rated, as at present, in
the 3rd degree under the Job Rating Plan. But if
the grievant is confined to the screw machine area,
without equal opportunity to work on the sets of
duties performed by the other two Inspectors, the
factor of Working Conditions for her segment of the
job shall be increased to the 4th degree.
In either event, the factor of Responsibility for
Safety of Others is properly rated in the 3rd degree.
Upon the application of either or both parties I will
either schedule a hearing or fix a date for submission
of briefs on the matter of retroactive pay, if any.

Eric J/T Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 29, 1970
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) " :
On this 29th day of October, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

Case No. 1330 - 746 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Textile Workers of America
Local 2548
and
Geigy Chemical

AWARD

Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated
in accordance with the arbitration provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the
following AWARD:

New jobs and permanent vacancies are being
posted as provided in the collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J/Schmertz
Arbit/ator
DATED: December 7th, 1970
STATE OF New York) ss
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 7th day of December, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged
to me that he"--, executed
the same.
"
—.

L -/•
ROSE P.
rnm2, Uallfled r- in Q^ens County
Commission Expires March 30,1971'
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
United Textile Workers of America
Local 2548, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Geigy Chemical Corporation
Cranston Plant

In accordance with Article XI Section 7 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 2, 1969 to February 27,
1972 between Geigy Chemical Corporation, Cranston Plant, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and United Textile Workers of America, Local 2548, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Are new jobs and permanent vacancies being posted
as provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
A hearing was held in Providence, Pvhode Island on August
31, 1970 at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

The

The parties filed post

hearing briefs.
The dispute is narrower than the stipulated issue.

The

Union's grievance is that the Company's policy of not posting
Class "C" vacancies in the Maintenance Department is violative
of Article VII Section 9 of the contract.

The Union does not

contend that the Company has failed to comply with the contract

- 2provisions regarding the posting of any other job vacancies.
It is undisputed that for many years, under the predecessor
contract, the Company consistently followed the practice of not
posting Class "C" job vacancies.

Instead it filled those open-

ings by direct assignment from the apprentice ranks, without
objection from the Union.
But the Union claims that during the negotiations leading
up to the current contract the Company agreed to henceforth
post class C job vacancies for bids under Article VII Section
9 of the contract; and that additional wording, negotiated as
part of that section in the current contract requires the posting of Class C vacancies in the Maintenance

Department.

The question therefore narrows to whether, in the course
of the negotiations for the current contract and/or under the
additional wording of Article VII Section 9 of the current
agreement, the Company agreed or obligated itself to change its
prior practice of not posting Class C job vacancies.

Or in

other words whether by agreement or contract language, the
Company is now required to post Class C job vacancies in the
same manner as it has posted vacancies in Class B, Class A and
Leadman jobs.
The testimony regarding the oral discussions between the
parties leading up to the current written contract is in sharp
conflict and contradictory, and I cannot find it conclusive one
way or the other.

Union witnesses testified that they called

to the attention of the Company certain inequitable consequences

arising from the practice of not posting Class C vacancies

- 3 primarily the "unfair" advantage accorded a less senior Class C
employee if he is assigned for an extended period of time to
one type of maintenance department work.

That experience might

give him an edge in any subsequent bid for a Class B craft
vacancy, over a more senior bidder who had not gained similar
experience.

In short, the Union argues that if such an advan-

tage is inherent in a long term Class C job assignment, that
Class C vacancy should be posted and filled in accordance with
the provisions of Article VII Section 9, rather than assigned
on a discretionary basis by the Company from the apprentice
ranks.
On the other hand Company witnesses who participated! in
the contract negotiations flatly denied that the Company agreed
to any change in its long standing practice of filling Class C
job vacancies by direct assignment from the apprentice ranks.
The best evidence of what the parties agreed to is of
course the ultimate contract language itself.

Article VII

Section 9 of the current agreement reads:
The Company recognizes the right of any employee
to apply for a new job or permanent vacancy, and
whenever such exists in a department, notice of
the same shall be posted for three (3) days in
the plant, and all laid-off employees shall be so
notified by certified mail. During that time, employees of that department or any other department including laid-off employees, shall have the
right to apply for such job or vacancy, and if
such job or vacancy is not filled as a result of
such application by an employee of that department,
the applications from employees of other departments shall be considered. ALL NEW JOBS OR PERMANENT VACANCIES SHALL BE POSTED AS TO DEPARTMENT,
AND IN MAINTENANCE AND SHIPPING AND RECEIVING AS
TO SHIFT, AND IN MAINTENANCE AS TO CRAFT. DOWN
BIDDING OR LATERAL BIDDING FOR NEW JOBS OR VACANCIES IN THE MAINTENANCE AND SHIPPING AND RECEIV-

- 5of a craft.

Only if and when they are promoted to a Class B

(or above) category are they deemed to occupy a "craft."
The new and additional language of Article VII Section 9
explicitly provides for the posting of new jobs or permanent
vacancies in the Maintenance Department as to craft. So long
as a Class C vacancy is not a craft I fail to see how this
language mandates the job posting of a Class C vacancy.

It

seems to me that if the Union intended to change Article VII
Section 9, so as to include a clear requirement for the posting of Class C vacancies, it could aPd should have obtained
better language towards that end.

Especially in view of the

long standing past practice of not posting Class C vacancies,
any contract language designed to achieve a contrary result
must be specific and precise.

In this case it should have ex-

pressly required the posting of Class C vacancies in a way
that would leave no doubt.
Section 9 does not do that.
to craft."

But the new language of Article VII
Instead it refers to posting "as

And inasmuch as Class C vacancies do not fall with-

in the scope of a craft, the language falls short of including
Class C vacancies within the posting requirements, no matter
what the Union may a

have intended.

Instead I find that the

added language merely delineates a new method by which the
craft jobs, namely those of Leadman, Class A and Class B are
to be posted.

But the new methodology does not expand the

scope of the jobs covered, and hence class C vacancies still
remain outside of that coverage.
With the foregoing conclusion I find it unnecessary to

- 4ING. DEPARTMENTS SHALL BE PERMITTED ONLY ONCE BY
EACH QUALIFIED EMPLOYEE DURING THE LIFE OF THIS
AGREEMENT.
The language underscored is what was added as a result of
the negotiations.

The non-underscored language is a repetition

of the same provision as found in the predecessor contract. I
have considered the underscored language and the Union's contentions regarding it, and I fail to see how it requires the
Company to now post Maintenance Department Class C job vacancies.
It is undisputed that a Class C job in the Maintenance
Department is a Helper classification.

It is also undisputed

that there has been no change in the Class C job description;
it has remained, as before, a Helper category.
ed is the fact that a

Also undisput-

Helper classification is not a "craft"

and work within it does not achieve the level of a "craft."
Rather, in the Maintenance Department, the "craft" classifications are the Class A and B jobs and the Leadman position. An
Employee in the latter three classifications works either as
a general mechanic, an

electrician, in refrigeration, in in-

struments, in the stockroom or as a painter.

An employee

classified as Class C may be assigned to any of those areas as
a Helper.

In practice Class C assignees have been both rota-

ted among those six categories of work, and at times, such as
in the stockroom, assigned as a Helper to the craftsmen, on an
extended and continuing basis.

But there is no claim or con-

tention by the Union that Class C employees, assigned in their
Helper capacity, occupy a "craft1'position or acquire the skill

- 6 decide whether or under what circumstances a Class C vacancy
is a "new job or permanent vacancy."

Nor do I see any rele-

vance of the added contract language regarding "down-bidding
or lateral bidding" to the instant dispute.

That latter lang-

uage refers to jobs which are subject to bids under the posting
provisions of Article VII Section 9.

And inasmuch as I have

found that Class C vacancies are not within the scope of jobs
to be posted, the"down-bidding or lateral bidding" contract
language has no bearing on the disputed issue.
If the result of this decision is to perpetuate certain
inequities - such as an unfair preference towards a Class B
promotion for a Class C incumbent assigned for an extended period of time to one category of work as a Helper, it must be
cured by negotiations between the parties.

Or, assuming the

Union attempted to solve it in the last negotiations, the
Union's remedy is by a more effective result, in the form of
better contract language within Article VII Section 9

lang-

uage which would unequivocally mandate the posting of Class C
vacancies.

As I have found that that was not achieved in the

last negotiations, nor under the additional language of Article
VII Section 9, it remains for subsequent negotiations and not
arbitration.

'
r

Arbitrator

f

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
and its affiliated GE-IUE, (AFL-CIO)
Locals;: Local 191 IUE
and

Award

General Electric Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated 1966-1969 and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards as follows:
The discharges of B. King and B. Anderson were
for just cause and are upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November /fl970
STATE OF New York )ss.COUNTY OF New York)
On this // day of November, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 32-30-0145-69

- 2 In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
and its affiliated GE-IUE, (AFL-CIO) '
Locals v; Local 191- IUE
1

Opinion

and
General Electric Company

i

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
National Agreement dated 1966-1969 between General Electric
Company and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers AFL-CIO and its affiliated GE-IUE, AFL-CIO Locals,
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator between the
above named parties to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of B. King
and B. Anderson? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Atlanta, Georgia on August 19, 1970
at which time Messrs. King and Anderson, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievants," and representatives of the General Electric Co., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local
191 hereinafter referred to as the Union," appeared.

Full

opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
trator's oath was expressly waived.

The Arbi-

The Company and the Union,

hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties," filed
post hearing briefs; and agreed to an extention of the due
date of the Award until on or before November 23, 1970.
The basis for the grievants1 discharge is the charge that

- 3 they arranged for and permitted someone else to punch their
time cards at the conclusion of their shift on Monday, April
14, 1969, in violation of the following work rule incorporated
in a Company publication entitled "Work Practices, Procedures,
Job Conduct:"
"Punching someone else's clock card or allowing
someone else to punch your clock card provides
just cause for dismissal."
The grievants and the Union on their behalf deny the
charges.

Though it is conceded that the grievants were away

from their work area and outside the plant at least 15 minutes
before clock out time, they and the Union contend that they returned to the plant in time to clock out; that in any event
the work rule is unenforceable because of laxity in its application in the past; that as piece workers who had attained at
least standard production that night, no damage was caused
when they left their work place prior to the conclusion of the
shift; and that merely leaving one's work area early without
permission of the foreman, albeit a work rule offense, is not
grounds for discharge.
I shall deal with the latter three defenses first.

The

record does disclose two or three incidents prior to 1967 when
the Company did not impose the penalty of discharge for the
offense of punching out someone else's clock card or permitted
someone to do so.

But at that time the work rule prohibiting

such misconduct was inadequately promulgated and disseminated
among the work force.
were cured.

But in 1967 the latter deficiencies

The work rule, together with its prescribed pen-

- 4alty was republished in two places - the document previously
mentioned and in the Company News Letter Transformers Topics,
and both were well distributed to and amongst the employees.
Indeed the grievants conceded that prior to April 14, 1969
they were fully familiar with the work rule and the penalty
for its violation.

So if the Company was lax in earlier years -

in two or three instances - it effectively tightened its procedures and put all employees on notice, on and after 1967.
Accordingly the present work rule and its prescribed penalty
are enforceable where a v iolation is found.
That the grievants are incentive or piece workers does not
allow them to leave their work areas before the end of the
shift without permission.

It is well settled that employees

must work the full hours of their shift even if earlier they
have met standard or incentive production.

Therefore, not only

may the grievants not be excused from a violation of the clock
card work rule (if a violation is found) on those grounds, but
also cannot be excused on that ground for breaching the rule
against leaving their work area without permission.
Third, there is no dispute over the fact that for these
grievants the bare act of leaving the work area without permission is not a dischargeable offense.

But it is a disciplin-

ary offense, and if coupled with a violation of the work rule
on "clock cards," it is manifest that the penalty of discharge
is booth contractually mandated and proper.
The question therefore narrows to whether, based on the
weight of the evidence, the grievants committed the offense
charged.

- 5On that question, aside from the sharply conflicting testimony on whether the grievants admitted or denied their culpability in the course of an investigation by the Company following the event, there is considerable circumstantial evidence
in support of the Company's action.

The grievants concede that

without permission of their foreman they left the plant some
time between 11:30 and 11;45 P.M., and that they were seen at
or near the main gate of the plant grounds by their foreman
at 11:45 P.M. or 15 minutes before the end of the shift.

Their

time cards show a clock out at exactly midnight.
The grievants claim that they left the plant early to
change a flat tire (on King's car, using Anderson's tools),
and planned to and in fact did return to the plant in time to
clock themselves out at 12 midnight.

Though this explanation

is technically possible, the circumstances do not support its
plausibility.

At 11:45 the grievants were located some 500

yards from their work area.

They had not yet fixed the flat.

Considering the distance and the time remaining to 12 midnight, I am not persuaded that they intended to both fix the
tire and return to clock out.

It is undisputed that Anderson

was anxious to get home that night without delay.

I doubt

he would have been willing to spend time to assist King in
changing a tire that close to the end of the shift, especially
in view of the probability that additional time, beyond the
12 midnight clock out, would be needed to get to the location
some 500 yards away, change the tire and return to the plant

- 6 to clock out.

In short I believe that more than 15 minutes

(after 11;45 P.M.) would have been necessary to complete that
plan, which would have carried both grievants past the 12 midnight clock out.

Indeed, only if the grievants had abandoned

their plan to change the tire, and instead returned to the
plant immediately upon being seen by the foreman, could they
have arrived back in time to punch themselves out at midnight.
But as that was not their original plan, I cannot conclude that
that was their original intention.
Moreover the testimony regarding their reaction to being
observed by their foreman renders their story vulnerable. They
stated that when seen, and thereupon realizing that they had
been discovered away from their work area without permission,
a work rule violation for which one of them had been previously
twice warned, they returned to the plant immediately.

But if

they had intended to return in any event by 12 midnight, why
the concern about doing so when observed at 11:45?

Frankly it

suggests to me, on the basis of their own statements, that but
for the fact that they were seen outside the plant before quitting time, they had not intended to return to clock out. That
means that they must have arranged for someone else to punch
their cards, and I believe they let that arrangement stand.
Whether in the absence of direct evidence on who punched
the grievants1 cards, the foregoing constitutes a sufficient
quantum of proof to meet the Company's burden of establishing
just cause for discharge is a close question.

But I resolve

it in favor of the Company simply because the grievants and the
Union, though alleging a defense, which if transformed into

- 7evidence would be highly persuasive, failed to offer that evidence in support of that allegation, though the knowledge
thereof and ability to do so was well within the Union's control.
Considering this latter circumstance, I conclude that the
evidence offered by the Company was sufficient to meet its
burden on a prima facie basis; that the burden then shifted to
the grievants and to the Union to come forward with evidence
in support of the alleged defense.

Specifically the grievants

and the Union assert that certain named employees were at the
time clock at 12 midnight and saw the grievants clock themselves out.
Yet though still employed, and readily available, these
named employees were not called by the Union to testify in
the grievants1 defense in this arbitration; nor although also
referred to, were they produced at an earlier unemployment insurance hearing.

The named employees are members of the Union

and within the bargaining unit.

For the Union to call them in

defense of its position in this arbitration is both logical
and wholly consistent with their status as bargaining unit employees.

In consequence of the substantial evidence advanced

by the Company, which can only be interpreted as prejudicial
to the grievants, I conclude it was the Union's responsibility
to bring forward evidence in support of its bare assertion
that other employees saw the grievants clock themselves out.
Not to do so suggests to me that no such defense exists.
1 am not impressed with the Union's explanation that those
named "witnesses1' were not called to testify or declined to

- 8 testify "out of fear of reprisal by management". There is no
evidence whatsoever that the Company has punished or engaged
in reprisals against bargaining unit employees who testify at
an arbitration in support of the Union's position.

Indeed I

am sure that this Union would know how to cope with any such
action by the Company.

Also the record discloses that during

the investigation of the case and the processing of the grievance, the Company sought information and evidence from the
Union which might lend credence to the grievants' claim that
they clocked themselves out that night.

That the Company urged

the Union to come forward with any such evidence, nullifies the
unsupported charge that the Company would punish an employee
who so testified.
An arbitration, albeit adversary, is a search for truth.
All material information, when raised as an allegation by one
or both of the parties, should be put forward in the form of
evidence.

Accordingly the Union and the grievants, having rais-

ed such an important assertion as a defense, failed to meet the
burden of coming forward with evidence in support of that defense, and have therefore failed to rebut the Company's prima
facie case when they should have done so.
For the foregoing reasons the discharges of B. King and
B. Anderson were for just cause and are upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

B ! ,.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Administrator
Fatr Ciaapaign Practices Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between:
Congressman Henry Helstoski
-andHenry L. Hoebel

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATORS, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by Congressman
Henry Helstoski and Mr, Henry L. Hoebel, candidates for Congress in the
Ninth Congressional District of New jersey, and the Fair Campaign Practices
Committee having determined and certified to the American Arbitration
Association that the dispute between the candidates can be decided by
arbitration, and having been duly sworn and having held a hearing on
October 29, 1970, FIND, as follows:
1. The Board of Arbitration has jurisdiction under the
Fair Campaign Practices Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
2. Both parties were duly notified of the time and place
of the hearing. In accordance with Section 13 of the Rules,
the Board directed that the hearing proceed although neither
Mr. Hoebel nor his representative appeared.
3. The evidence before us is therefore confined to that
presented by congressman Helstoski, who testified under
oath.
k. Based on the evidence before us we find that certain
campaign material and statements of Mr. Hoebel misrepresent
and distort the Congressional voting record, activities and
intentions of Congressman Helstoski in violation in the fourth
pledge as to conduct contained in the Code of Fair Campaign
Practices.

Y
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union, District 50
United Mine Workers of America
Local 13226

Award

and
Hercules Incorporated

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated May 21, 1967 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Award, as
follows:
A "substantial change" in the job of welding turret
line plugs to lead wires occurred in April, 1967.
The provisions of Section IX of the contract did
not bar the Company from making a prospective revision in the piece work rate in April, 1969„ The parties shall attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable piece work rate. If unable to do so within 60
days of the date of this Award, they may, on the request of either or both, refer that question to this
Board of Arbitration for a final and binding determination.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Joseph Barbash, Esq,
Concurring

Duane Groves
Concurring
Dissenting

DATED:

May

1970

STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )':
On this
day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED:

May

1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF

)
) "' :

On this
day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Joseph Barbash to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: May

1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF

)
' cq
) '*

•

On this
day of May, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Duane Groves to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0938 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

International Union, District 50
United Mine Workers of America
Local 13226

'
'
'

and
Hercules Incorporated

'
i

Opinion
of
Chairman

'

In accordance with Section V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated May 21, 1967 between Hercules Incorporated,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International
Union, District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 13226,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was
designated as the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration
to hear and decide, together with Mr. Duane Groves and Joseph
Barbash, Esq., the Union and Company designated Arbitrators
respectively, a dispute involving the Company's right to revise
the rate on the job of welding turret line plugs to lead wires
in the Bridgeing and Filling Department.
A hearing was held in Kingston, New York on February 27,
1970 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties ex-

pressly waived the Arbitrators' oath.
The Board of Arbitration met in executive session in New
York City on May 6, 1970 following which the hearings were declared closed.
The threshold issue in dispute is:

- 2 Whether the provisions of Section IX of the contract prohibit the Company from tightening the
piece work rates in April 1969, almost two years
after a "substantial change" in the job (upon which
the revision is based) took place?
The parties stipulated that if that question is answered
in the negative, the piece work rates which obtained prior to
the revision would be re-established; but that if the question
is answered in the affirmative, they would attempt to negotiate
a mutually acceptable piece work rate with this Board of Arbitration retaining jurisdiction over that question if an agreement could not be reached.
The first question, as indicated in the foregoing issue,
is whether the "substantial change" took place as early as two
years prior to the rate revision.

I am persuaded that it did.

Though it is conceded that a change in the job operation occurred in June of 1968 in connection with lowering the conveyor
and work table, neither the Company nor the Union assert that
this change alone constituted a substantial change within the
meaning of Section IX of the contract„

Indeed the Company con-

cedes that either or both of the changes which occurred in
April 1967, namely the installation of a wire slitter and the
increase in the plug pin size met the requirements of a substantial change.

And the Company further admits that irrespect-

ive of the lowering of the conveyor and work table in June 1968,
the two earlier changes in April 1967 stand on their own as
substantial changes for the purpose of rate revision.

In

other words, as I see it, the Company would have made a revision in the rates and bases its substantive right to do so on
the April 1967 changes alone.

- 3 The Union argues that the language of Section IX of the
contract precludes the Company from waiting two years after
a substantial change in job content to tighten the piece work
rate.

The pertinent provisions of Section IX with the lang-

uage relied upon by the Union underscored read;
(a) Wage rates for purposes of the Agreement shall
be those set forth in Schedule "B" annexed
hereto. Piecework rates will be adjusted in
accordance with past procedures.
(e) Piecework rates shall be established so that
average earnings for groups of trained proficient pieceworkers will be $2.88 plus or
minus 5% per hour. Alj^rates shall be set by
the Company in accordance with established
Industrial Engineering principles.
(g) When the piecework job content is substantially
changed, either by simplified methods or by
added requirements, the job will be considered
a new job for the purpose of rate setting.
The Union contends that the word "When" in Paragraph
(g) above means, if not forthwith after the substantial change,
at least within a reasonable time thereafter.

And that almost

two years is too long.
It also claims that the phrase "piece work rates will be
adjusted in accordance with past procedures" in Paragraph (a)
and "all rates shall be set .... in accordance with established Industrial Engineering principles" both mandate rate revisions soon after any substantial change has occurred in the job,
as has been the practice with regard to other rate revisions
in this plant.
Obviously, in the absence of any explicit contractual time
limit on when a piece work rate revision may be made, the
Union's case is one of implicit limitation based on its inter-

- 4pretation of the underscored language.

I am not persuaded

that the Company is so restricted by any such implicit limitation.

It seems to me that if the parties intended to place a

time limit on when a piece work rate could be tightened they
should and could have done so in a more express manner - by
placing a specific period of time in Section IX of the contract.
I am not satisfied that the underscored language relied on by
the Union represents a substitute for what could have been negotiated as a precise time limitation.

Rather I believe that the

relied upon language was intended and in fact relates to the
methodology of establishing and changing piece work rates rather than the timing.
As I see it the word "when" means "not until," or in other
words is designed as a protection to employees on piece work
jobs, by prohibiting the Company from making any changes in the
piece work rates before a "substantial change" has occurred.
In other words it immunizes the employee from a piece work rate
change upon the occurrence of small or minor job changes and
does not open up the job to a rate revision until those minor
changes, cumulatively, become substantial, or a substantial
change in and of itself takes place.
But I am not persuaded that the word "when" either means
or was intended to mandatorily and contractually require the
Company to make rate revisions immediately or within any period
of time.
Similarly, I cannot read a specific time limit into either
of the other two underscored phrases.

I believe they were in-

- 6will evaluate the methods, output and earnings. During the seventy (70) working day
period, adjustments will be made if necessary
to keep the rate in proper relationship with
the rate in paragraph (e). The Union will
have a maximum of twenty (20) working days
after the said seventy (70) day period to request that the rate of pay for such new or
changed piecework job be subject to negotiations between the parties hereto without affecting the remainder of this Agreement.
Clearly the employee is again not prejudiced.

The new

piece work rate is only temporary over a maximum of 70 working
days.

And thereafter if the Union protests the accuracy of

the rate it becomes a matter for negotiations between the parties and presumably arbitration under the Agreement.

So again

the Company's unilateral act in revising a piece work rate,
even after an extended period of time following the substantial
change upon which that revision is based, is not final.

It is

subject to review, negotiation between the parties and an adjudication as to its accuracy by the Board of Arbitration.
So, in light of that protective provision, I am all the
more satisfied that the other provisions of Section IX of the
contract should not be read to imply a time limitation on the
Company for the revision of piece work rates following a substantial change in a given job.
For the foregoing reasons the Union's claim that the
Company is barred by the provisions of Section IX of the contract from tightening the piece work rates on the disputed
job is denied0

In accordance with the agreed to stipulation

the parties shall attempt to negotiate a mutually agreed upon
rate, failing which within 60 days of the date of this Award,

- 7 that question may be referred back to this Board of Arbitration
by either or both parties.

Eric J/xSchmertz
Chairman
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NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 22026, Federal Labor Union
AFL-CIO
and

'
'
i
'
'
'

Award

Hess Oil and Chemical Division,
Amerada Hess Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named Parties, and dated August 1, 1969 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The Company violated the Agreement by transferring
certain maintenance and operating work with respect to tanks 1214, 1215, 1216, and 1220 from Local 22026 members to Operating Engineer members
and in transferring maintenance work on tanks 1217,
1218, 1219, 1221, 1222 and 1223 in the same fashion.
The Company is directed to restore this work to
Local 22026 and its members. The Union's request
for a monetary remedy is denied.
/

Eric/a. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 2, 1970
STATE OF New York )ss>:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 2nd day of October, 1970, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 69-358

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 22026, Federal Labor Union
AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Hess Oil and Chemical Division,
Amerada Hess Corporation

In accordance with Article 20 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 1, 1969 between Hess Oil and Chemical Division, Amerada Hess Corporation, hereinafter referred
to as the "Company," and Local 22026, Federal Labor Union,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the
following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the Agreement by transferring certain maintenance and operating work
with respect to tanks 1214, 1215, 1216 and 1220
from Local 22026 members to Operating Engineer
members and in transferring maintenance work on
tanks 1217, 1218, 1219, 1221, 1222 and 1223 in
the same fashion. If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on August 14,
1970 at which time representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
pressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The parties ex-

The Company filed a

post hearing brief.
The evidence convincingly establishes that when the work
referred to in the stipulated issue was originally assigned

- 2 to Local 22026 members it was not by unilateral action of the
Company^ but rather was a jurisdictional arrangement negotiated and agreed to by the Union and Company in 1963, confirmed
by letter dated April 15, 1964, from a then Company Vice President to the Union's attorney and thereafter affirmed by more
than five years of unvaried practice.

As such I find that the

Union's specified work jurisdiction in connection with the
tanks referred to in the stipulated issue achieved the status
of a contractual condition of employment, jointly negotiated
and thereafter followed by both parties to the contract.
The rule in such situations is well settled.

Mutually

agreed upon conditions of employment may not be unilaterally
changed by either party except in the most compelling and extraordinary circumstances.

I do not find the Company's reas-

ons for eliminating the Union from its work jurisdiction on
the tanks involved (in Tank Field #3) and the assignment of
that work to the Operating Engineers (which previously shared
jurisdiction in Tank Field #3 with the Union) to so qualify.
The fact is that the Company has not established a causal relationship between the Union's work on the stipulated
tanks and the rupture on October 30, 1969 of tank 1214.

The

Company speculates that had not the work in Tank Field #3 been
shared by the Union and the Operating Engineers, closer attention might have been given to the tanks, and the signs of a
rupture on tank 1214 might have been discerned and corrected
before the rupture took place.
But the Company concedes that it has no conclusive evidence in support of this reasoning.

It does not flatly con-

- 3 tend that but for the shared jurisdiction in Tank Field #3 the
rupture and attendant oil spillage would have been prevented.
But rather only that it might not have happened.

On this basis,

presumably to protect against any further such accident the
Company unilaterally withdrew work jurisdiction from the Union
in Tank Field #3 and assigned all of the maintenance and operating work there to the Operating Engineers.
Not only does the evidence presented in this case not establish a causal relationship between the Union or the shared
jurisdiction and the rupture of tank 1214, but the specific
facts indicate, to me at least, that the probability of detecting the early stages of such a rupture was remote, even if the
Operating Engineers or a single union had complete jurisdiction
over Tank Field #3.

The rupture occurred because the ground

underneath the tank either shifted or sank, producing unusual
stress on the tank's bottom plate, which ultimately cracked.
Based on the record I am not persuaded that full performance of all required maintenance and operating work in Tank
Field #3, either by one or both unions, would have detected
the problem.

The Company suggests that the members of the

Union did not check the capacities and status of the tanks
each time required, but merely repeated the figures taken from
previous tests.

While this may be true, there is no probative

evidence to support it as a matter of fact.

Also the Company's

complaint that Union members may not have given full and adequate attention to their duties - and that this may have had
something to do with the rupture of tank 1214, - would be more
properly, in my judgment, the subject of disciplinary warnings

- 4and other disciplinary penalties as a protection for the future than unilateral and total deprivation of the Union's work
jurisdiction in Tank Field #3.

Especially when that jurisdict-

ion was mutually agreed to as part of the 1963 contract negotiations, and carried out as an unvaried practice for several
years thereafter.

That no Union members were laid off, or

lost their jobs or received less pay or overtime subsequent to
the Company's unilateral elimination of the Union from Tank
Field #3 does not mean that the Union or its members are not
prejudiced.

For though they have not yet suffered job losses

or diminuation in income, the effect may be damaging in the
future.

For example, in the event of a large layoff in the

other tank fields, the Union, if deprived of work jurisdiction
in Tank Field #3, would be unable to exercise bumping rights
into that Field (because the jobs had been taken over by the
Operating Engineers.)

In short, with a reduction in the area

over which the Union enjoys job jurisdiction, the total availability of jobs to absorb large numbers of laid off employees
is either actually diminished or potentially reduced.
Accordingly I grant the Union's request for an order directing the Company to return to the Union its jurisdiction
over the stipulated tanks in Tank Field #3.
Union's request for a monetary remedy.
the affected employees lost their jobs.

But I deny the

As indicated, none of
They were assigned sim-

ilar work elsewhere without loss in regular pay.

Also there

is not sufficient evidence to support the Union's claim that the
employees would have enjoyed more overtime had they not been
taken off their work in Tank Field #3.

Eric J/'Schmertz
Arbit/ator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

United Papermakers and Paperworkers'
Local 800, AFL-CIO
'

Award

'
i

and

Johns-Manville Products Corporation'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 16, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows

Christmas Day 1969 shall be deemed as time
worked (8 hours) for grievant Allen, and
New Years Day 1970 shall be deemed as time
worked (8 hours) for grievant Bulauskas in
computing overtime for the work-weeks in
which those holidays fell under Article VI
Section 13 of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

July

1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)Ss.:
)

On this
day of July 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330

0293

70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
i

United Papermakers and Paperworkers'
Local 800, AFL-CIO
'
Opinion

and

'
i

Johns-Manville Products Corporation'

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 16, 1968 between
the above-named Parties the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving grievance 5B.
A hearing was held in Manville, New Jersey on June 30, 1970
at which time representatives of the Parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and to cross-examine witnesses.

The Parties expressly

waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The dispute relates to the application and interpretation
of Article VI, Section 13 of the contract which reads:
When any of the above holidays falls within the first forty (40) hours of an employee's
scheduled workweek, it shall be counted as time
worked (8 hours) for each such holiday in computing overtime for the employee for the particular
workweek, whether or not the employee worked such
time on such holiday or holidays.
The grievants are Messrs. Anthony Bulauskas and William
Allen.

The holidays in question are Christmas Day 1969 and

New Years Day 1970.
The grievants received holiday pay for the two holidays in
question.

There is no dispute that under their respective work

schedules, Christmas Day was a scheduled day off for Allen and
New Years Day a scheduled day off for Bulauskas.

-2The Union contends that whether as scheduled work days
or not, holidays must be counted as time worked in computing
overtime for the particular workweek in which the holiday falls,
and that this has been the Company's practice.

The Union

concludes therefore that either Christmas Day and New Years Day,
though not worked by grievants must be credited to them as time
worked, thereby entitling them to some overtime pay for the
weeks in question, (they each worked five or more days excluding
the holiday in the respective week that the holiday fell).
It is the Company's position that a holiday is to be
counted as time worked only if it is a day on which an employee
would have worked as part of his regular workweek had it not been
a holiday.

And that because these two holidays fell on one of

the two days in each of those weeks that each grievant was
scheduled off, they do not qualify as time worked for the payment
of weekly overtime in excess of 40 hours.
Both sides rely in part at least, on the language of
Article VI Section 13, which they both assert is clear and
supportive of their divergent interpretations.

The Company reads

that section to mean that the holiday must fall not only within
but as part of the first 40 hours of an employees regularly scheduled workweek for it to count as time worked for overtime.

The

Union interprets it to mean that if the holiday falls somewhere
between the beginning and end of an employee's 40 hours of
scheduled work, or in other words sometime before the 40 hours
of work are expended (even if the holiday falls on a day off), it
must be counted as time worked for computation of overtime beyond
40 hours of that week.
That the parties interpret the clause differently, while
arguing its clarity, points up its obvious ambiguity.

Indeed

-3-

I find that the disputed clause is subject to either interpretation
with equal logic.

If it was meant to require that the holiday

fall within what would have been part of the employee's
scheduled work week, the clause could easily have provided the
words "and as part of" after the word "within" in the second
sentence thereof.

Though this may have been the intent, a

different interpretation is also possible.

The phrase "within

the first 40 hours" can also mean the intervention of a holiday
sometime after the beginning of a 40 hour work period, but
before its end.

And in the case of the grievants, where a

portion of their 40 hours is worked before a day off and the
balance thereafter, a holiday which falls on an intervening day
off can be construed as a holiday that falls within the first
40 hours of that employees scheduled workweek.

Indeed that the

latter interpretation is as logical as the former is evidenced
by the fact that the Company has in the past paid overtime on the
very basis advanced by the Union in this case.
I shall rely on the traditional approach in situations
where the contract language is ambiguous - namely to apply past
practice.

Though the Company asserted at the hearing that its

investigation showed past practice to be "all over the lot", the
Company's answer to the Union's grievance indicates otherwise.
It states in part:
"We agree we have erred in the past, thus
causing the employee to be overpaid."
Had the contract section been clear and unequivocal in
support of the Company's interpretation, past errors in payment
would not have been so damaging. But where the clause is
ambiguous as I have found it to be, the "error" of the Company
in making payments in the past is prejudicial.

It is an example

not only of how the Company applied the disputed contract language
but stands as evidence of what the clause meant.

Under the

-4circumstances a clarification of the clause in support of the
Company's position or a change in the language to conform to the
interpretation advanced by the Company in this case, must remain
a matter for negotiations.
Accordingly Christmas Day 1969 shall be deemed as time
worked (8 hours) for grievant Allen, and New Years Day 1970
shall be deemed as time worked '(8 hours) for grievant Bulauskas
in computing overtime for the work-weeks in which those holidays
fell under Article VI Section 13 of the contract.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

V

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
United Papermakers and Paperworkers'
Local 800 AFL-CIO
'
and

'

Award

Johns-Manville Products Corporation'
t

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 16, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The Company did not violate Article XXII Paragraph
75 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated
August 16, 1968 when it failed to assign overtime
in accordance with Paragraph 14 of a document entitled "Proposed Overtime Procedure-Department 160"
dated January 1, 1966.

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

July 2-<?1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this '

)sg .
)
day of July, 1970, before me personally came

and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No.1330

0395

70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

United Papermakers and Paperworkers '
Local 800 AFL-CIO
'
'
and
'
i
Johns-Manville Products Corporation '

Opinion

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above-named Parties
and dated August 16, 1968, the Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company, on February 2, 1970, violate
Article XXII, Paragraph 75, of the collective bargaining agreement dated August 16, 1968, when it
failed to assign overtime in accordance with Paragraph 14 of a document entitled "Proposed Overtime
Procedure - Department 160" dated January 1, 1966?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Manville, New
Jersey on July 9, 1970 at which time the representatives of the
parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and to cross-examine witnesses
The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
Paragraph 14 of the "Proposed Overtime Procedure-Department
160" reads:
Overtime required for inventory, employees shall be
selected as follows:
1st Qualifications
2nd low men on overtime
The inventory in question was performed on the first shift
on February 2, 1970, and not on an overtime basis.

Therefore

Paragraph 14 of the overtime procedure is not applicable. On that
basis alone the Union's?' grievance fails.

-2-

However lest this not be a full and satisfactory answer,
I am persuaded that the Company's action in taking inventory on
February 2 was in no way materially different from its prior
practice.

Previously as in the instant case this type of inventor

was taken on the day shift.

Similarly the Banbury machine was

shut down and its day shift crew was assigned to the inventory
work.

Undisputed is the fact that this type of ticketed inventory

has always required that machine to be shut down.

So in those

respects the inventory taken on February 2nd was no different
from monthly inventories taken over the previous five years.
Nor do I find that the Company's action on February 2
improperly deprived employees of overtime.

I find no significant

difference between the operation of the Banbury machine on
February 2nd on the second shift, with its crew working overtime
after the inventory was completed, and the prior practice of the
Banbury crew working overtime on a day or days subsequent to the
inventory in order to make up the time lost.

Either way the over-

time went to the Banbury crew and not to other employees.

And

in both situations it was to recover production lost as a result
of the inventory.
In short the events of February 2, 1970 no more impinged
on the rights of other employees than did any other monthly
inventory over the p revious five years.

And I find nothing

contractually wrong with that practice.

ic7<^. Schmer t z
Arbitrator
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Asociation of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District 47, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Johns-Manyille Products Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 29, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The Company has the right under Article 12
Section 12.3 "Hours of Work and Overtime1'
to change an employee's shift during the
normal work week.

Eric /T. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October 16, 1970
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 16th day of October, 1970, before me personally
camd and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0345 70

MAURICE L. SCHOENWALD
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF NEW YORf
No. 30-8839725
Qualified in Nassau County
'farm Expires March 30, 1971

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District 47, AFL-CIO
Opinion
and
Johns-Manville Products Corporation

In accordance with Article 20 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 29, 1968 between Johns-Manville
Products Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company"
and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, District 47, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Does the Company have the right under Article 12
Section 12.3 "Hours of Work and Overtime" to
change an employee's shift during the normal work
week? If not what shall b.e the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company's plant in North
Brunswick, New Jersey on September 30, 1970 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath and contract provision for a tripartite
Board of Arbitration.
Article 12 Section 12.3 reads:
The work-week and payroll week shall begin on
the first (night) shift on Monday morning and
shall continue for seven (7) days throughout
the last (evening) shift Sunday. The work-day
on Monday shall begin on the first (night)

- 2 shift on Monday morning and shall continue for
twenty-four (24) consecutive hours. Each successive day of the work-week will begin and end at the
same time as the work-day on Monday. Prior to the
beginning of any work-week, the COMPANY may schedule within the work-week those days on which an
employee is to work, and those days on which he
is to rest, and for any subsequent work-week may change
such schedule when deemed advisable; however, the COMPANY shall not require an employee to forego on his
regularly scheduled work days solely to avoid payment
of overtime for the particular work-week.
Both the Union and the Company rely on the express language of the foregoing clause and the past practice of its
application in support of their respective but divergent interpretations of that contract provision.
1 find the language of the contract clause to be clear;
to be supportive of the Company's interpretation; and the evidence of "past practice" if material at all to the issue in
dispute, too scant to alter that interpretation.
The language of Article 12 Section 12.3 clearly prohibits
the Company from changing the beginning and ending hours of
the 24 hour work day within the period of the scheduled work
week; and within a prescribed work week prohibits the Company
from changing the days on which an employee is to work and
rest.

Only after the expiration of a scheduled work week and

prior to the beginning of a new work week may the consecutive
hours of the 24 hour work day, or the days on which the employee is to work, be changed.
But there is nothing in that contract clause which either
addresses itself to or prohibits the Company from changing
the hours of an employee's 8 hour shift within the fixed 24
hour work day or on the fixed days he is scheduled to work.

- 3 It seems to me that if the parties intended to restrict the
Company from changing an employee's shift hours they would
have included that prohibition together with the restrictions on the Company's right to change the starting and finishing time of the 24 hour work day and the days of the week
on which the employee is to work and rest.
But a restriction on changes in shift hours was not negotiated as part of Section 12.3 and I find no basis upon which
it can be justifiably inserted or implied.
In short, based on the language of the foregoing contract clause, so long as there is no change in the consecutive
24 hour work day, and no change in the actual days of the
week an employee is scheduled to work and rest, the Company
is not proscribed from changing the hours of his shift.
The evidence of "past practice" advanced by the Union
is not persuasive, simply because the situation which gave
rise to this grievance never previously occurred, at least
so far as the record before me is concerned.

It is undisput-

ed that shift changes have been made within a prescribed 24
hour work day and fixed work week at least once or twice a
month over the last few years.

It also appears that in each

instance the affected employee(s) assented to the change so
that the question of the Company's right to require an employee to change his shift never arose.

In my judgment the

fact that employees in the past have been willing to accept
changes in their shift hours during a prescribed work week,
does not mean that the Company does not have the right to
require them to do so if thevoluntary arrangement fails or

_

- 4proves insufficient.

Much more relevant would be the evidence

of "past practice" demonstrating that the Company permitted
employees to decline shift changes; or that the Company bypassed employees unwilling to voluntarily accept shift changes;
or that the Company took no action to obtain a full quota of
employees when an insufficient number volunteered or assented.
But though the Union alleges, only in general terms, that
in the past some employees were permitted to refuse a change
in shift hours, there is no evidence of a single specific case.
Hence in the absence of any such relevant past practice, the
bare language of Section 12.3 must stand.
In short, the burden is on the Union to show a practice
which supports its contention that a restriction on changes
of shift hours should be included as part of the interpretation of Section 12.3; and based on the record presented in
this case the Union has not met that burden.
confined to the contract.

My authority is

Whether the Company's action in

exercising its contractual right to require shift changes is
consistent with good labor relations is not within my jurisdiction to judge.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 47 I.A.M. & A.W.
and

Award

Lily Tulip Cup Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
The three day suspension of Terence Sweeney
is reduced to a one day suspension. The
Company shall pay him for the two days lost.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June

1970

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss. :
)

On this £»"day of June, 1970, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
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II

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"

District 47 I.A.M. & A.W.
and

Opinion

Lily Tulip Cup Corporation

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Lily Tulip Cup Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and District
47 I.A.M. & A.W., hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the three day suspension
of Terence Sweeney? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Woodbridge, New Jersey on May 12,
1970 at which time Mr. Sweeney, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument,
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties ex-

pressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
A review of my decisions will disclose that I have not
hesitated to uphold disciplinary penalties,including the penalty of discharge, where an employee, whether a Union representative or not, directed profane and abusive language to a
supervisor in a manner or with an intent that was personal,
insubordinate, contemptuous or disrespectful.

It is well

settled that personal vilification of a supervisory employwe

- 2 by a member or representative of the bargaining unit is improper unless justifiably provoked, no matter what the setting
within the employment relationship between the two may be.
However, in the instant case, though there is no question
that the grievant used profane and obscene words and phrases
to Foreman Elsman, I conclude under the circumstances involved,
that the use of that language, unnecessary and unwarranted as
it was, did not reach the level of personal vilification or
abuse.
The incident took place in the course of what I consider
to be an adversary setting - a meeting called by Mr. Elsman,
to "instruct and caution" employee Rivera on the dangers and
impropriety of "horse play"in the plant.

The grievant in his

capacity as a Union Shop Steward accompanied Rivera. The grievant1 s conduct thereafter was in that capacity.

As such he had

the right to object to both the calling of the meeting and to
what took place in the course of it, whether or not his grounds
for objection were meritoreous.

On the same basis, and again

in his capacity as Shop Steward he had the right to express the
view that the meeting was disciplinary in nature.(The Company's
characterization as "instructional" notwithstanding.)

And

that it was improper unless the Company had evidence that
Rivera was guilty of horse play, again irrespective of the
merits of that point of view.
I agree with the Union's assertion that as a shop steward,
the grievant was entitled to deal with the foreman as an equal,
and to vigorously protest both the procedural and substantive
aspects of the meeting.

Clearly the grievant's attitude and

- 3 demeanor were harsh, abrasive, highly partisan and profane.
Yet I conclude that the unsocial language used was both common
to this plant, and the kind of colloquial language which the
grievant would use as an instrument of protest, if as shop
steward he wished to express himself in the strongest terms
possible against the Company's action.
In short though I can appreciate why Foreman Elsman took
offense and why he interpreted the language as a personal
attack on him, I believe the grievant meant it as an attack on
the nature of the proceedings, i.e., the meeting itself, and
as a defense of his Union member whom he represented, rather
than as a personal or insubordinate attack on Foreman Elsman.
This is not to say that in discussions or even inevitable
arguments between Union and Management representatives, the
use of profanities, which may be interpreted as personal invectives, may be used.

Indeed representatives of both sides

should be placed on notice that vigorous representation, including the right of protest and the use of the grievance and
arbitration provisions of the contract are fully available to
protect the rights of employees without resort to unsocial
words and expressions which could well, in other circumstances
be interpreted either by this or subsequent arbitrators, as
abusive and insubordinate, warranting discipline.

All that I

mean is that in this particular case, limited to the particular
circumstances herein, the grievant's intention was to act

i
aggressively as a shop steward rather than to disrespectfully
abuse the foreman.

^

Therefore I cannot find that his language

- 4 exceeded the bounds of propriety within the context of an adversary proceeding between a Union steward and a foreman, though
it was dangerously close to the brink.

And it should be avoid-

ed in the future, as both unnecessary and unwarranted, and with
this notice, subject to an interpretation adverse to the one
using it.
However, I do find that the grievant acted improperly in
another respect.

He disrupted and prematurely ended the meet-

ing which Foreman Elsman had called.

In doing so the grievant

stepped beyond the bounds of his role as shop steward.

No

matter how irregular or improper he considered that meeting,
he had no right to abruptly withdraw from participation and take
employee Rivera with him before Foreman Elsman had concluded.
If he objected to the meeting he could have stated so.

He could

have filed a grievance against any or all aspects of the meeting,
and the rights of Rivera as well as those of the Union could
have been both adjudicated and protected by use of the grievance
and arbitration provisions of the contract, if the objection
was well founded.

I find no justification for his refusal to

permit Foreman Elsman to "instruct" Rivera about horse play,
even in the face of Elsman's remark that a written notice of
the meeting would be placed in Rivera's employment file.

If

the grievant or the Union considered that procedure wrong, the
use of the grievance procedure, subsequent to that meeting, was
fully available to redress that wrong.

But when the grievant

removed himself and also instructed Rivera to leave the meeting
before its completion, he improperly impeded the foreman from
carrying out a supervisory function.

Foreman Elsman had ordered

- 5 the meeting, and the grievant, by taking Rivera from it before
its completion in effect countermanded

that order.

For that

action I am satisfied that some discipline is warranted.
The record indicates that the Company, in suspending the
grievant for three days, relied on the grievant's total conduct at the meeting with Foreman Elsman - the use of profanity
and the refusal to permit the foreman to carry the meeting to
its end.

Because I uphold the Company on the latter charge but

not the former, I shall reduce the penalty to what I consider
appropriate within my authority to fashion a remedy.

It appears

that the Company relied more on the profanities than the premature termination of the meeting.

Also there is no evidence

that the grievant, as an employee, has a prior disciplinary
record or as a steward has engaged in prior irresponsible conduct.

Therefore I shall reduce the three day suspension to a

one day suspension.

The Company is directed to pay the griev-

ant for two days lost.

^L^^c
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Eric J. S c h m e r t z *
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Research Development and Technical
Employees Union
and

Award

Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above named Parties and dated October 19, 1968 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards as follows:
I find that by his express, unconditional and undisputed statements to Company representatives, and
by confirming conduct, John Neuzil voluntarily quit
his employment at the Draper Laboratory.
Though
there is no doubt he was dissatisfied with his job
assignment, I am not persuaded that he was under
the kind of pressure, tension, or other emotional
strain as would cloud his comprehension of the import of what he said and did and the consequences
thereof. Nor is there evidence to support the claim
that his decision to quit was forced, coerced, or
brought about by the undue influence of the Company
or its representatives. If he retained mental reservations, or if he intended his statements and action
to be conditional, no such indication was manifested.
And therefore none can be imputed as either understood
by or known to the Company.
Accordingly the Union's grievance that he was discharged is denied.

Eric J. Schtnertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 7 1970
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) "'':
On this / day of December, 1970, before me personally
came and appealed Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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